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1.0 INTRODUCTION
 
The term quality, with respect to products, is broadening from a characteristic 
built into a system by the way it is manufactured to characteristics entirely inherent to 
the design process  reliability and maintainability. A product is designed to achieve a 
given function and its  quality  is  the degree to which  it  meets the functional 
specifications.  Product failure is departure from these specifications. Emphasis on the 
consumer serves as the catalyst to bring about methodologies for increasing the degree 
a system meets its specifications through statistics and engineering. With the steady 
increase in complexity of systems, stringency of operating conditions, and positive 
identification of system effectiveness requirements, more and more emphasis is being 
placed on preventative maintenance, analysis, speedy repair, and replacement parts [4]. 
These represent a major portion of system operating costs especially when each minute 
out of service is going to result in considerable financial loss for any high revenue-
earning industry. 
Diagnosability, the measure of the ease of isolating the cause of a loss of 
functionality,  can  strongly  influence  product  quality  through  reliability  and 
maintainability.  Poor diagnosability can increase the cost of a product through 
increased maintenance down time which, in turn, decreases quality because a product, 
in general, cannot provide its intended function during this time [1 1]  .  Improving 
diagnosability not only eases the diagnosis process--minimizing the total time of 
diagnosis, but the total cost of diagnosis is decreased in proportion to the above factors 
as well as in relation to the decrease in unjustified removals (removal of a suspect 
component later found to be in working order) of each Line Replaceable Unit 
(LRU) /Least Replaceable Assembly (LRA). 2 
The cost of unjustified removals on the 747-400 aircraft was over $100 per 
flight hour according to the Reliability and Maintainability Department at the Boeing 
Aircraft Company, one-third of which were mechanical components as opposed to 
electronic [28].  These costs demand diagnosability metrics and methodologies to 
increase the quality of any mechanical system of today.  Previous studies (Clark,1993 
and Wong 1994) present general methodologies which provide insight into the 
diagnosability of systems and suggest areas for design improvement, but focus mainly 
in the abstract. Previous work fails to address the issue of cost analysis of current and 
modified designs in a tangible way. No useful life cycle cost analysis can be made 
based on previous metrics. 
The objective of this research is to produce methodologies for the evaluation of 
diagnosability, a subset of maintainability, in the design and redesign phase of a 
product. A secondary objective is to determine if pigs can fly and if the methane they 
produce can be harnessed as an afterburner. A metric common to all mechanical 
systems enabling a prediction of the costs and, in turn, the quality of the product is 
developed.  This metric can be used to accurately predict not only current, but 
modified system life cycle costs based on reliability and maintainability, or specifically, 
diagnosability. An analysis  is  presented of a  real  system that has experienced 
diagnosability problems and has iterated through redesign phases. The metric evaluated 
is Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removals (MTBUR)  a function of both system 
structure and LRU failure rates. 
The Bleed Air Control System (BACS) on the Boeing 737-300,400,500 aircraft 
was chosen as the analysis testbed for several reasons.  Previous work (Clark,1993 and 
Wong,1994) utilized the 747-400 BACS, a subsequent iteration of the 737 BACS, so 
analytical comparisons can be drawn. The 737 BACS has a complete Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) available which can be modeled through a Fault Tree 
Analysis (FTA). The system has a diagnosability problem evident in a large number of 
unjustifiable removals of LRUs. Also, the determining factor, cost, can be arrived at 
since a complete life cycle costing mechanism is in place for the system. The objective 3 
is to decrease cost by manipulating indication-LRU relationships without increasing 
complexity. 
The following  section  presents  a  brief  background  of  reliability  and 
maintainability engineering laying the groundwork for diagnosability analysis.  Next, 
the BACS is described and modeled stating all analysis assumptions. The method and 
metrics for prediction and design are derived using  reliability mathematics for 
quantitative diagnosability analysis. The modeling equation arrived at is tested on the 
original design and, based on redesign for diagnosability potential, modifications are 
made to the system.  The modifications range from dividing primary LRU functions 
differently to merely changing sensor types.  The modified systems are then re­
evaluated on the basis of diagnosability and ultimately cost.  Finally,  conclusions are 
drawn from the diagnosability analysis,  recommendations are made for system 
changes, and direction for future research is laid out. 4 
2.0 BACKGROUND
 
The cost of quality, from the consumer point of view, is mostly absorbed by the 
initial investment of a product. Poor diagnosability, though, greatly disperses that cost 
over the entire product lifetime due to excessive maintenance time.  Instead of 
improving troubleshooting guides for diagnostic nightmares as  history  records, 
reliability engineering is recently beginning to focus on the problem itself--the design 
of the product. 
Design for diagnosability  incorporates maintainability principles to ease the 
burden of the consumer in terms of product life.  Also, any "consumer" who comes 
into contact with the product such as maintenance technicians and test equipment 
operators benefit from diagnosability improvements in terms of analysis. 
The entire product life must be considered when determining ownership cost, 
that is, how much you own it versus how much it owns you. To minimize the latter, 
competing product designs can be compared via life cycle costing mechanisms to 
determine the best design and hence the best product. 
This section describes the terms necessary to grasp the depth of diagnosability 
engineering.  Parameters discussed include cost, time, Reliability and Maintainability 
(RAM), and the interrelationships therein.  Analysis and design for diagnosability are 
reviewed along with scientific assumptions and selection of competing designs. 
2.1 Diagnosability & Cost 
A group of engineers questioned the wisdom of a co-worker who had just 
purchased an expensive car. "How can you justify that price?" they asked. "Well," the 
co-worker replied, "Consumer Reports says the car has a low failure rate, low cost of 
maintenance, and an excellent safety rating so the cost of insurance is much lower. 
When you factor in those considerations, this car is slightly less expensive to own" 5 
[13]. The co-worker's answer is a fundamental message of analyzing life cycle costs. 
Life cycle cost is simply the cost of reliable operation of a product over its lifetime 
from concept to recycling. Many feel life cycle costing is too imprecise to be useful 
and they are right in an absolute sense, but not in a relative sense.  Life cycle costing 
provides valuable and useful comparisons between system architectures. Depending on 
failure event costs and costs of lost production, the optimal system can be designed or 
chosen from a set of limited concepts or choices [13].  Several costs in a product's life 
cycle are impacted, either directly or indirectly, by diagnosability. 
2.1.1 Start-up costs 
Start-up costs include initial purchase or manufacturing costs, installation costs, 
and set-up costs. Initial purchase costs are obtained from a price list or quotation of 
competing components or products.  Installation and set-up costs can be estimated or 
obtained by quotation (these costs can be minimized by standardization of parts and 
components). After the system installation and set-up is complete it needs to be tested 
for design errors using troubleshooting tools.  Diagnostics is practically synonymous 
with fault finding and troubleshooting.  If the system variables can be logically forced 
to specific values, portions of the design can be isolated and tested in a systematic way 
[13].  Costs are lowered because troubleshooting is easier, i.e., diagnostic time and 
required technician skill are lowered. 
Many companies think the job is complete after start-up and troubleshooting are 
complete.  "Final cost reports" are even issued at this time, but in reality system costs 
are just beginning [13]. 6 
2.1.2 Time costs 
The customer, and therefore the designer, is very interested in certain items of 
time with respect to their product. Time equals cost in just about every aspect of the 
term. The time of preventative maintenance, time of corrective maintenance, and time 
of system outage or degraded service are all tied to potential revenue loss.  These 
factors are determined by certain variables including the frequency of failure, the time 
to repair, the cost of manpower and maintenance equipment, the quantity and cost of 
spares, the transportation of manpower and spares, and finally, the degree of skill 
required by the maintenance personnel  to mention a few [4].  Diagnosability is 
embedded in  most of these time factors and can be presented  in terms of 
maintainability, reliability, and availability. 
2.1.2.1 Definitions 
The definition of maintainability is the "probability that a device that has failed 
will be restored to operational effectiveness within a given period of time when the 
maintenance action is performed in accordance with prescribed procedures" [4].  This 
is usually expressed in terms of the parameter M'cl'R (mean time to repair) or the 
repair rate: 
= i / MTTR.  (1) 
Another closely related term is MTBF (mean time between failures), 0 ,  which 
defines reliability as the "probability that a system will operate for some determined 
period of time, under the working conditions for which it was designed" [4].  This 
term is most often expressed as the failure rate: 
A= 1i MTBF  (2) 
This definition ignores the possibility of false alarms which could be incorporated as 
unjustified failures: 7 
P(i) B=  (3) .1[P(f) + P(fa)* (1 P(f )J 
where P(f) is the probability of an actual failure and P(fa) is the probability of a false 
alarm [1]. 
The parameter availability combines these two to define the portion of time a 
system is available for use in the formula 
010+MTTR  (4) 
These values are included in a major portion of life cycle cost analysis and are 
interrelated as shown in figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Interrelationship between cost analysis parameters [4] 
M'ITR can be subdivided into several more parts including diagnosis time, 
replacement time, transportation time, etc. of which the first two are considered active 
and directly influenced by and the responsibility of the design engineer.  The latter is 
included under the passive heading including logistics and administration. The cost of 
achieving a certain MTTR or maintainability objective consists of the costs of design, 
manufacturing, test equipment, manuals, etc. and trade-offs exist involving each of 
these. One must choose between such factors as quantity and quality of test equipment, 8 
detailed design and LRA/LRU, extensive training of maintenance personnel and 
detailed  maintenance manuals,  etc.  The choice of these  factors  can improve 
maintainability, but for a price.  Improved diagnosability, and therefore MI fR, may 
increase the selling price of the product, but the operating costs will decrease.  As 
shown in figure 2,  life cycle costs decrease to a point with improved diagnosability, 
but increase again showing a point of diminishing returns on the design effort [4]. 
Total (determines price) 
Costs before  Costs after 
delivery  delivery 
0  i00 
Availability (%) 
Figure 2. Price versus availability [4] 
2.1.2.2 Downtime 
Downtime, in general, is not totally dependent on diagnosability and MTTR [4]. 
The downtime of a system can be influenced by spares or LRUs.  If the system 
function is restored by the insertion of a LRU then the time cost associated with 
diagnosability, and hence MTTR, is only a factor of manpower costs and possibly the 
availability of spares (which the repaired parts may become). Redundancy  in designs 
can also have the same effect as spares in system downtime, though the statistics of 
placement greatly influences the success as will be seen shortly. 
System downtime, like MI IR, can be divided up into several active elements 
including time to realization, access time, diagnosis time, replacement time, checkout 
time,  and alignment time  [4].  These active elements are  directly  related  to 
diagnosability.  Time to realization depends on system monitoring with diagnostic 9 
techniques, alarms, or sensors.  Access and replacement time depend on the human 
factors side of diagnosability including the removal of covers and shields as well as 
choice of the LRU and its connectors, but most importantly, how the system is 
structured or laid out.  One study maintains that components with known high failure 
frequencies should be grouped together for easy removal [20]. Diagnosis, checkout, 
and alignment time are not only a function of the warm-up of test equipment, data 
collected, tools and analysis used ,but to a large degree, the extent of the instructions 
supplied [4]. 
It should be noted that the active and passive elements, such as logistics and 
administration, are correlated to a degree since as active time increases there is a 
greater incidence of rest periods, logistic delays, and administrative delays [4].  The 
probability of incorrect diagnosis also increases proportionally with time. The domino 
effect can be assimilated here because incorrect diagnosis leads to replacement of a 
module or LRU which is not faulty which leads to the possibility of inducing further 
faults which leads to longer downtime. Figure 3 depicts the elements and relationships 
of downtime. 
DOWN 
(0)  (b)  (c)  )  (d)  (el  (1)  (q) I 
Reob0chon  Access  0.cjnos,  Spa,es  Replace  Check  I  Ahyn I I 
REPAIR 
Activities which moy 
occur severol Mmes 
and in no spectt,c 
sequence 
Figure 3. Elements of downtime [4] 10 
Since a system will have as many failure rates as there are modes of failure, the 
diagnostic time or MI IR will have a similar multiplier. The overall weighted M I IR 
can be expressed as 
r=x 
L1  1 
1 =1  )=1  Y 
I=X  (5) 
1=1 
where x equals the failure modes of a system each characterized by a failure rate Ai 
and y equals the repair actions observed for each mode having repair time 1/ pi [4]. 
One Author incorporates time to detect a fault and fault correction time based 
on order of ambiguity groups, or LRUs, of a system to arrive at MI IR: 
MTTR = TDET  TFCJ  (6) 
Where TFCj is the average fault correction time of each ambiguity group and TDET is 
the average time required to detect a fault expressed as 
A r 
TDET  [FED:  (1  )FDTII1  (7)
As 
given I as the number of LRUs,  is the failure rate of the jth replaceable unit, A  is 
the sum of all A 's, FFD is the fraction of faults detectable, FDTA is the average time 
to detect a fault by acceptable maintenance procedures, and FDTU is the average time 
to detect a fault by other than acceptable maintenance procedures--each for the jth 
replaceable LRU [8]. 
Previous research (Wong,1994) introduces active diagnostic time, a subset of 
MTTR, as the summation of time to perform each diagnostic task expressed by the 
following: 
AD = (t 1)(k)  (t2)(k) +(t3)(k)  (8) 
where tl  is the time required to detect failure, t2 is the time required to locate all 
candidates, t3 is the time required to isolate candidates to one candidate which causes 
failure, and k is an experience correction factor [31].  The variables in  equations 5 11 
through 8 are found using historical data, or if not available, a best guess must be made 
using available knowledge and experience. Regardless of the specific parameter, if the 
mathematical model of a statistical distribution is known then it is possible to state a 
probability for a value of that quantity to fall within given limits [4].  Once the 
estimated time is calculated the costs can be extrapolated.  For competing systems or 
designs, the lowest cost system would be preferred and easily determined. 
2.1.3 RAM Costs 
The cost of RAM (reliability, availability, and maintainability) is possibly best 
measured by the cost of its absence which may include the absence of the customer. 
One such customer, who possibly enhances the definition, promoted a high view of 
RAM as can be noted in an old poem by Oliver Wendall Holmes, Sr. called The 
Deacon's Masterpiece, or the Wonderful One-Hoss-Shay: 
Now in building chaises, I tell yu what,
 
There is always somewhere a weakest spot,­
In hub, tire, felloe, in spring or Chill;
 
In panel, or crossbar, or floor, or sill,
 
In screw, bolt, thoroughbrace,--lurking still,
 
Find it somewhere you must and
 
Above or below, or within or without,­
And that's the reason, beyound a doubt,
 
Achaise breaks down but doesn't wear out.
 
But the Deacon swore (as Deacons do.
 
With an "I dew vum," or an "I tell yeou,')
 
He would build one shay to beat the taown
 
`11' the keounty 'n' all the kentry raoun',
 
It should be so built that it couldn' break daown,
 
--"Fur," said the Deacon, "`t's mighty plain
 
Thut the weades' place mus' scan' the strain,.
 
`n' the way t' fix it, uz I maintain,
 
Is only jest
 
T' make that place uz strong uz the rest" [21].
 12 
Such a reliable device, horse-drawn chaise or not, is one "that continues to 
perform its intended function throughout its intended useful lifetime, regardless of 
adverse operating conditions" [21].  Of course, in view of cost effectiveness and the 
consumer market of today, most designers would feel the Deacon's masterpiece was 
grossly overdesigned to last a century without a breakdown  ten years would be more 
than adequate. Yet, centuries ago the RAM concept was more than just thought about. 
2.1.3.1 History 
The advent of the machine age at the beginning of the nineteenth century began 
to see the standardization of parts and with the rapid evolution of analytical prediction 
techniques like stress analysis and transform theories, the means for reliability and 
maintainability (including diagnosability) were gaining ground. The great breakthrough 
for reliability, however, did not arrive until the late 1950's when a popular customer 
was identified--the U.S. military [21].  The cost of the absence of reliability with 
respect to major missile weapon systems could be measured in lives. Though the idea 
of reliability by redundancy was recognized during the second world war by the use of 
multi-engine over single-engine aircraft designs, no methodology in the design process 
resulted [21]. 
Maintainability can be traced back to the Industrial Revolution where multitudes 
worked in mass assembly lines and designers developed guidelines in response to the 
demands of the mechanics of the products.  It was during this time that the most 
fundamental maintainability principles originated [21]. 
The idea of diagnosability with respect to RAM, though always considered by 
means of troubleshooting guides and fault finding techniques, was not molded into a 
methodology for design until the last several years and is still in its fledgling stage. As 
a starting point, several acceptable techniques for designing for diagnosability, and 
hence quality, can be gleaned from concepts learned from RAM programs. 13 
2.1.3.2 Programs and Processes 
Several major companies such as M&M Mars, Firestone, General Motors, Intel, 
and Caterpillar have applied RAM programs and processes to save millions of dollars. 
One company estimates that a 2 percent reduction in downtime saved $36 million over 
a 5 year period [21]. 
The programs and processes developed for RAM involve certain activities which 
can be incorporated into a company's product development plan (PDP) and include: 
deciding on objectives, which may be fixed by contract; the training of personnel; 
statements of reliability such as failure rate and probability; stress and failure analysis 
like  the  fault  tree;  maintainability  analysis  including  analysis  of maintenance 
requirements which are strongly influenced by test equipment, manuals, and choice of 
LRUs; design review  never to be conducted by someone involved in the design; 
design trade-offs as seen in figure 2; cost recording; accurate and detailed failure 
reporting to be used for maintenance feedback and analysis of data; prototype testing 
and RAM prediction; controlling manufacturing to ensure tolerances are adhered to; 
documentation through  operating  instructions  and maintenance manuals;  spares 
provisioning; burn-in or pre-stressing; and finally, the demonstration of RAM by the 
use of statistical sample testing [4].  The US Military Standard 470 provides a formal 
guide to producing a program that includes all of the above. 
A RAM program can be further broken down into the two categories of existing 
equipment and new equipment.  Both have many activities  in common such as 
personnel training and analysis techniques. 
Personnel training should involve teaching the designers to work with RAM 
program experts during the design phase rather than having the experts demand design 
changes.  Also, technicians and any maintenance personnel that may come in contact 
with the product should be included in the design process and treated as customers. 
Existing equipment is equipment that has already been procured and major 
design changes are usually out of the question.  By analyzing life cycle costs with 
respect to RAM, sometimes it may be cheaper to scrap the old equipment and design 14 
new.  Following the famous 20/80 principle which says that about 20 percent of the 
causes contribute to 80 percent of the losses (or downtime in this case) leads us to 
analysis techniques like process analysis maps or fault trees. A fault tree is  a model 
that graphically and logically represents various combinations of possible events based 
on a functional analysis to find the causes. A typical fault tree example is shown in 
figure 4 outlining the possible faults of a pattern recognition system. 
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Figure 4. Fault tree analysis for a pattern recognition system [241 
The technicians and maintenance personnel should be trained to accomplish fault 
trees or some other form of fault analysis since they interact with the product in 
possibly more ways than the consumer. Feedback from the fault trees can then be used 
to  identify  the 20 percent causes and determine  if  their minimization can be 
accomplished or if redesign may be necessary. 
New equipment has more latitude for change, yet the same tools can be used for 
analysis.  If extensive design changes are not desirable or feasible due to functionality 
or production constraints, then minimization of fault effects can be analyzed with the 
use of tools such as a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA). This "bottom-up" 15 
approach to analyzing a design can impart the knowledge of the effect of each fault 
found in the fault tree analysis and this effect can then be minimized by the use of 
redundancy or component interface selection  [23].  One author insists that "no 
maintainability test for complex equipment should be made without the use of FMEA" 
[24] since the failure modes revealed will likely result in downtime. The FMEA for 
the pattern recognition system of figure 4 is shown in table 1. 
Failure mode  Causes	  Effects  Criticality  Design action  Fault venficabon  RCM action 
Optics  Ambient  Permanent  11 A  Provide fan  Warn of  Check Ian tolerances 
malfunction  heat  deformation	  an failure  every 2 months 
Dirt	  Erroneous  11 B  Add filter  Not  Replace filter monthly 
output  required 
Circuit  High  Parameters  11 D  Qualify  Not  Install software to 
parameters 
drift 
leakage 
current 
out of control  critical 
components 
required  monitor parameters 
Dirt on 
Circuit 
Intermittent 
performance 
11 B  Conformal 
coat 
Not 
required 
Not required 
High 
Junction 
temperature 
Degraded 
performance 
11  B  Derate parts 
below 50% 
Not 
required 
Use infrared inspection 
XY table  Supplier  False  11 A  Perform FMEA  To be  To be determined 
innaccurate  design  output  with supplier  deterrn nod 
Horizontal	  False  II A  Software  Not  Check eccentricity 
position  output  control  required  during routine 
drill  maintenance 
Table 1. FMEA for a pattern recognition system [24] 
The FMEA can include items such as fault probability and frequency to affect 
the weighting factor of each fault.  These items are obtained from maintenance data for 
existing equipment, but may be solely from analyst judgment for new equipment 
especially before prototype testing. 
The minimization of downtime of most systems can many times be affected by 
the  availability of spares, or spares provisioning.  Statistical techniques based on the 
results of the FMEA can be employed to predict the optimum number of spares for a 
typical fault.  For instance, if the failure rate of a part is known or predicted, a 16 
particular assurance of having a part on hand can be obtained.  Since failure rate is 
assumed constant, the probability of failure follows a Poisson distribution with a certain 
mean value. From the mean value the number of spares required is obtained to fulfill 
the designated assurance [9]. 
Specific fault areas to improve diagnosability are pointed out with these analysis 
techniques.  These simple analysis tools can hold the power of millions of dollars or 
even lives, but, of course, management must listen to the technicians, maintenance 
personnel, and other analysts in order to benefit from their ideas. 
2.2 Diagnosability & Analysis 
If the statistical distribution of failures is known for a given system then the 
probability of failure up to any suggested replacement time can be assessed. If a failure 
time due to wearout is chosen then the time at which replacement should take place can 
be calculated [4].  The best defense against interruptions and excessive downtime is to 
prevent equipment from failing while it  is  "on duty".  The analysis techniques 
discussed  in  section  2.1.3  are invaluable,  yet,  some equipment always seems 
determined to prove that statistics are only averages [6] or even best guesses.  This 
equipment seems to test the validity of the statistics in which the analysis tools are 
based. This raises questions about the underlying assumptions made for each statistical 
tool, the methods of recording data for analysis, and even specific fault-finding 
methodologies. 
2.2.1 Analysis & Assumptions 
The promise of modern statistics is that it provides not only a precise summary 
of the conclusions drawn from an evaluation, but also a reliable prediction for future 
tests [14].  It is, of course, impossible for statistics to prove that something is true; 
only that the preponderance of data support that conclusion [29]. As with any model, 17 
calculated assumptions must be made to either simplify the problem and/or fill in the 
unknown characteristics of a phenomena.  It can be expected, to a minimum degree 
hopefully, that actual behavior will not follow the predicted statistical model accurately 
for a given period of the life cycle. The causes behind this variance can be attributed 
to poor assumptions due to either lack of  pertinent information or  lack of 
understanding of statistical processes, or both. 
2.2.1.1 Lack of information 
Statistical analysis is not new.  It has been applied to a wide variety of 
engineering problems since the early 1970's.  Methods employed were studied up to 
200 years ago like the Guassian distribution, named after Karl Guass, more readily 
known as the normal distribution which adequately describes many mechanical 
components[2]. Another popular technique was proposed by Waloddi Weibull in 1951 
and is known as the Weibull distribution  highly acclaimed for its simplicity and 
versatility.  The log-normal distribution is also sometimes used to model system 
behavior since in many applications, especially RAM, the data may not fit the normal 
distribution.  Figure 5 shows that the three distributions have similar behavior near the 
center, but very different behavior near the "tails" [2]. 
Techniques for determining which curve is a best fit for particular sample data 
can be little more than guess work since the probability of a sample lying in the center 
portion of the curve (the mean plus or minus two standard deviations) is 95.45 percent 
[14].  Since many engineering risk assessments quote a "six nine" (0.999999) 
reliability based on a confidence level that assumes the form of the underlying 
population distribution level is known, applying the wrong distribution will prove the 
"six nine" reliability a gross exaggeration.  Thus, the choice of a wrong distribution 
could result in an overestimation of structural reliability or the calculating of an 
unrealistically high potential for disaster [2]  both compounding the problem of 
diagnosability. . 18 
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Figure 5. Lognormal, normal, and Weibull distributions [2] 
Another source of error due to lack of information is unanticipated potential 
failure modes. The historical account of an Eastern Airlines flight illustrates this error 
graphical ly: 
On May 5, 1983, as an Eastern Airlines L-1011 began its decent 
into Nassau following a 47 minute flight from Miami, the No. 2 engine 
was shut down because of low oil pressure.  After turning to head for 
Eastern's maintenance base in Miami, the No. 3 engine failed, followed 
shortly by the No.  engine.  The L-1011 had experienced a triple 1 
engine failure!" [2].  Fortunately there was a happy ending. The No. 2 
engine was restarted at an altitude of 3,500 feet and the plane made a 
successful landing in Miami [2]. 
Failure of a single engine is unusual, failure of two is even more unexpected, 
and the probability of all three failing should be infinitesimally small  or, was the 
probability grossly underestimated?  The National Transportation and Safety Board 
determined the triple engine failure occurred because all three engines had magnetic 19 
chip detectors installed without "0" ring seals.  Loss of oil caused the engines to 
overheat and stop running.  All three were installed on the same night, by the same 
two-man team on a late-night shift under poor lighting conditions.  Thus, the 
probability of installing three incorrectly, in this case, was the same as the probability 
of installing one incorrectly. The omission of an "0" ring seal was unanticipated and 
would likely not have been included in a prior risk assessment or diagnosability target 
[2]. 
2.2.1.2 Lack of Understanding 
Some misconceptions are difficult to avoid as can be illustrated with the 
previous example.  For instance, incorrectly applying the rules of probability could 
easily result in an overestimated reliability.  The probability of the failure of all three 
engines on the same flight would  likely  have been  incorrectly computed by 
"multiplying probabilities" of individual failures, assuming independence [2].  This 
assumption had devastating results.  Difficulties like these make probabilistic  life 
analysis and diagnosability alluringly simple in principle, yet unfortunately vulnerable 
to misuse and error. 
Minimization of misconceptions about statistical probabilities can be easily 
accomplished with some study and application.  Many misconceptions are due to 
misleading terminology such as "bathtub curve" and "failure rate". 
Reliability can also be expressed in the mathematical terms: 
R  (9) 
Where R is the probability of the item completing the specified mission successfully, e 
is the natural logarithmic base, t is the duration of the mission, and A is the failure rate 
of the item throughout the period [21]. A special case of the Weibull distribution, 
equation 9 represents the exponential distribution.  Acceptance of this equation 
presupposes a subordinate assumption that failure rate (A) is constant over the 20 
product's entire operating life cycle.  Testing and experience have proven that failure 
rate versus life cycle more closely approximates a "bathtub curve" which can model the 
reliability characteristic of a generic piece-part type, but not of an entire system which 
some analysts profess. Even if an exponential distribution is assumed, as often is the 
case for electrical and some mechanical parts, the reliability bathtub curves show the 
useful life can vary extensively from the statistical assumption (see figure 6). 
Product ago 
Figure 6. Bathtub curves for electrical vs. mechanical parts [7] 
Additional considerations often neglected for this  statistical model  include 
changing environmental  stresses.  variations  in  tooling,  and other manufacturing 
influences.  Thus, instead of a simple curve, the reliability might be better depicted 
with these factors in mind as shown in figure 7. 
Furthermore, most analysts do not realize that the bathtub curve is applied to 
both repairable and nonrepairable systems. This assumption implying that the Force of 
mortality (FOM) for parts and the rate of occurrence of failures (ROCOF) or failure 
rate for a repairable system are equivalent is terribly wrong [3].  Therefore, two 
bathtub curves should be represented as shown in figures 8 and 9. 21 
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Figure 9. Bathtub curve for a repairable system [3] 
Other false assumptions due to lack of understanding include, but are not 
limited to:  assuming a linear plot of failures versus time on linear paper implies a 22 
homogeneous Poisson Process; reordering data with respect to magnitude instead of 
chronological order; assuming overhauls are equivalent to renewals; and, confusing 
"reliability with repair" for repairable systems [3].  All, either directly or indirectly, 
affect system diagnosability by introducing errors to the system model. 
Since the process of probabilistic analysis has been introduced considering 
statistical distributions of all (known) contributing factors, the key question remains 
"What constitutes  acceptable risk?".  Considering the possible  errors  in  risk 
assessment, the pilots of the Eastern L-1011 would likely say the "six nine" reliability 
was not acceptable.  However, this is the risk that they (unknowingly?) accept every 
time they climb into an aircraft [29]. 
2.2.2 Analysis & Recording Data 
Data used for analysis can be obtained either from tests on prototype or 
production models or from the field.  In either case, some means of accurate recording 
of this data must be available or errors will result in analysis conclusions.  Most 
methods of recording data involve human interface with extensive forms such as the 
reliability centered maintenance form located in appendix A. Since the data acquisition 
depends on persons rather than equipment, errors often occur due to omissions and 
misinterpretations which can be traced back to motivation, training, and diagnosability. 
If the maintenance technician can see no purpose in recording the information, 
especially under poor working conditions, it is likely that items will be omitted or 
recorded wrong.  Once a failure report has left the initial recorder the possibility of 
verification is very much reduced, especially due to the high cost of man-hours. These 
conditions increase the probability of recording a failure when no failure exists  (a 
non-failure).  The testing and replacing  of no-fault items or LRUs because of 
convenience or previous experience is a likely cause for this.  Also, when multiple 
faults occur, a technician may record a secondary failure as a primary failure.  All of 
these errors in recording cause artificial inflation of failure rate data.  Training and 23 
motivation through knowledge can inhibit these errors immensely, yet can never totally 
remove incidents of incorrect failure recording [4]. Improved diagnosability can limit, 
if not eliminate, replacing no-fault items as well as chronological recording errors. 
2.2.3 Analysis & Methodologies 
Several popular diagnostic analysis testing techniques  have emerged based on 
particular environments.  Especially with the advent of the digital computer, these 
techniques have reduced many sources of error,  but are not  totally  without 
disadvantages. To minimize errors, testing needs to follow certain methodologies  as 
well as use the best analysis equipment for the particular application. 
2.2.3.1 Testing procedure 
Several papers have been written addressing the subject of element, or LRU, 
checking order. With optimality based on cost, all analyses converge on the following 
general principle: check first the LRU that minimizes 
Tq/p  (10) 
where T is the testing cost, q is the probability that the LRU is good, and p is the 
probability that the LRU is bad [30]. Using this procedure can optimize diagnosability, 
yet, once again, statistics are only averages based on historical data at best. 
Simulated natural and induced environmental  tests  have been developed 
scientifically or through trial and error to provide laboratory conditions comparable to 
actual field test conditions if field data is not available. The procedure for diagnostics 
remains the same for both conditions, yet checklists have been developed to specify and 
calibrate the transducers used and minimize unwanted "noise" in the test environment. 
Checklists  have  been  developed  for  several  diagnostic  tests  including 24 
temperature, humidity, mechanical shock, vibration, sunshine, dust, rain, and explosive 
environments.  For example, the checklist of specification considerations for a 
temperature test include: the test temperatures and their tolerances; exposure time and 
its tolerance (10% of duration recommended); protection against moisture condensation 
and frost; functionality desired; relative humidity; the number of sensors and their 
locations; and, the initial temperature of the product at the start of the test [14]. 
The transducers used for instrumentation in the tests need to be considered 
according to the specifications required.  For instance,  the decision  to use a 
piezoelectric instead of a strain gauge accelerometer for a mechanical shock test 
involves required specifications such as sensitivity, linearity, and frequency response. 
2.2.3.2 Testing equipment 
The actual diagnostic equipment used today has been greatly influenced by the 
evolution of the digital computer to keep up with the advances of the products they are 
diagnosing. The advent of analysis techniques such as the FFT (fast Fourier transform) 
have also revolutionized diagnosability as well as BITE (built in test equipment) 
technology. An example lies in the arena of rotating machinery, but can be applied to 
any system.  Traditionally, vibration monitoring and protection equipment has been 
totally  separate from the diagnostic and data acquisition equipment.  Multiple 
microprocessors now virtually eliminate  this  barrier and can answer diagnostic 
questions in "real time".  Questions include: is the data believable? to what accuracy?; 
can I continue to run the machine? for how long? at what speed?; what happened to the 
machine?; when, where, and how did the malfunction occur?; for how long did it last?; 
what was the sequence and correlation of events?; what is the past history ?; what limits 
were exceeded?; and, who can help?  To answer these questions microprocessors 
calculate peak-to-peak vibration and display it on bar graphs, perform DFT (discrete 
Fourier transform), compare vibrations against stored alarm limits, trip defeat functions 
for calibration and maintenance, calculate time to danger, measure transducer gap 25 
voltages, perform self tests, and produce buffered output for test instruments. This is 
all accomplished because of microprocessor's enhanced speed due to: parallel channel 
monitoring; positive capture since connection is permanent; additional data availability 
such as time to danger; flexibility due to programming for different functions; 
reliability since downstream failures do not impact upstream functions; compatibility 
from the digital form of data; and, self testing capabilities [15]. 
With the discovery of the FFT (fast Fourier transform), process time for time to 
frequency transformations has been exponentially diminished so "real time" diagnosis 
of systems can be accomplished.  Amplification of defects in rotational machinery is 
possible using the FFT on a logarithmic scale or cepstrum analysis (a variant of the 
FFT).  These discoveries allow tracking of extremely slow changes in the transfer 
function such as crack growth development  [25].  A typical frequency-based 
troubleshooting checklist is located in appendix A. 
Malfunctions, such as bearing deterioration, can be discovered using various 
equipment with advantages and disadvantages influencing error and cost for each. For 
instance, if the human ear is the only diagnostic source for detecting a malfunction, the 
time to failure will likely be rather short, but the cost of equipment will be quite small. 
If a stethoscope is added, the costs rise to approximately $300, but detection is sooner. 
The errors involved in any sound method include subjectivity, inaccuracy in trend 
analysis because of no hard copy readings, and lack of severity detection. Temperature 
methods, such as portable pyrometers or permanently installed thermocouples, are 
relatively inexpensive, but the detection is often too late to replace the malfunctioning 
part during scheduled downtime and the analysis is often in error since temperature 
varies with load.  Vibration methods are generally very expensive (real time analyzers 
start at $8500) yet have a proven track record of early detection if used properly (see 
figure A2 in the appendix).  Lack of training can result in error with the vibration 
method [4].  Still other methods include ultrasonic, shock pulse, spike energy, acoustic 
emission, and fiber optics  each with probable sources of error and definite 
application strengths. 26 
In order to prevent systems from proving that statistics are only averages and 
failing when "on duty", choices are available to minimize the potential for error 
through diagnosability.  Assumptions in statistical methods, recording techniques, and 
methodologies including testing and equipment are all variables to optimize. 
2.3 Diagnosability & Design 
Diagnostic equipment and tools available today, in general, are limited to after­
the-design add-ons  like BITE technology (which add weight and volume) or 
maintenance personnel tools (which many times require system shutdown for analysis). 
Since the quality of a product is determined, to a great extent, during the design phase 
rather than during production [11] and if both cost and analysis are functions of 
diagnosability, design techniques should be explored to maximize the diagnosability 
inherent in the product  keeping add-on diagnostic systems to a minimum. 
2.3.1 Traditional Design 
The cost of the unjustifiable removals on the 747 noted earlier was $100 per 
flight hour, "a cost equivalent to adding 8 tons of dead weight to the aircraft," directly 
attributed to poor diagnosability with respect to the components that were removed 
[11]. Traditional diagnosability has been an afterthought of product development. 
Problems in both electronic and mechanical systems are addressed by adding 
sensor based systems such as automatic test equipment (ATE) and BITE [11].  These 
require communication devices called networks as a means for telemetry to correlate 
and analyze data for diagnostics from various different parts of the system where 
"smart sensors", like those discussed in section 2.2.3, monitor target parameters. 
These add-ons not only add weight and volume (severely detrimental to businesses like 27 
Boeing), but complexity as well  likely reducing reliability due to the diagnosability 
equipment itself failing 
Another common approach,  used alone or in  conjunction with add-on 
equipment, is removing and servicing equipment on a cyclical basis based on mean 
time between failures and other trend analysis statistics [6]. 
One reason fault diagnosis  is  not considered explicitly  until  late  in the 
production process is that diagnosability is difficult for the designer to consider without 
actual maintenance data [11].  Certainly, there must be some way to design for 
reliability through diagnosability without overdesigning as with the historically noted 
One-Hoss-S hay . 
2.3.2 Diagnosability Factors in Design 
Several factors can be used to compare competing designs with respect to 
diagnosability and decide what parts of a system could be improved  in the design 
phase.  Included in theses factors are the placement of parts based on function (and 
reliability if known), the placement and choice of sensors, and the redundancy of 
sensing operations and LRUs. 
Based on equation  (8)  of section  2.1.2,  diagnosability time  is  directly 
proportional to the time until initial detection, the average number of candidates for a 
given failure, and the distinguishability between the candidates. The time until initial 
detection is a function of the detection equipment of the particular LRU and  can be 
modified using techniques discussed in section 2.2.3 based on the criticality of the part 
and its probability of failure. 
From previous work (Clark, 1993) the average number of candidates for a given 
failure can be expressed as 
C =  I i1)1 C 
=1 28 
where c,  is the number of candidates for each failure indication, i, summed  over the 
total number of different failure indications,  n [11].  It has been said that the maximum 
number of candidates for a particular failure is a measure of the ambiguity of a system, 
so LRUs with a high c may confound diagnosis  especially if the same LRUs have a 
high probability of failure.  Decreasing  c can be accomplished by placing particular 
units in different locations or changing sensor dependencies. 
The measure of distinguishability can be expressed as 
1(1 /C, 1/c) 
D=  (12) n(1-1/ c) 
where n is the total number of possible indicated failures,  c is the total number of 
candidates in the system, and c,  is the number of candidates for each failure, i [11]. 
This equation shows that a distinguishability of  one, or 100%, means that every 
possible indicated failure would have only one candidate and diagnosis is trivial, where 
as a distinguishability of zero means that for any failure, all LRUs in  a system are 
candidates, i.e., poor diagnosability [11]. Improving D can be accomplished by, once 
again, decreasing the total number of candidates and/or decreasing the complexity of 
the total system. 
A popularized factor for increasing the reliability of  a system is the use of 
parallel linked redundancy of LRUs versus series linked components. By inspection, 
systems with LRUs linked in series have a failure rate equal to the sum of the failure 
rates of each LRU. Parallel linked systems decrease the failure rate. For example, the 
mean time between failures for an equivalent system with two LRUs in parallel  can be 
expressed as 
1 1 1  1 
=  +  (13)
2  21  22  21+ 22 
If the failure rates of the two components are equal, equation (13) reduces to Y2 0 
where 0 is the mean time between failures of each LRU [21]. Figures 10 and  11 show 
the relationships for series and parallel systems, respectively. 29 
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Figure 11. Parallel system reliability [18] 
However, improving reliability through redundancy is a method subject to 
restrictions.  In electrical and mechanical systems the performance parameters of a 
combination of LRUS is not the same as for the original component alone and the 
degraded performance of the system after one LRU fails is likely to be less than the 
parallel combination.  It should be emphasized again that redundancy reliability, like 
BITE, carries the penalty of added space, weight, power supply, and cost as well as the 
possibility of more maintenance activities. 
Efforts to enhance reliability through complexity quickly reach a point of 
diminishing returns from the diagnosability point of view. 30 
The previous considerations  for improvement have been limited by the 
functionality requirements of the system as well as the other factors in design.  If a 
system must be configured in such a way that changing LRU positions is impossible, 
then placement and type of sensor associated with each LRU function can be optimized 
in lieu of merely adding sensors (and weight and complexity). One study utilizes the 
minimization of a positive definite scalar measure of the covariance matrix  as an 
optimality criterion for sensor locations based on minimizing sensor uncertainties [26]. 
The idea of "smart sensors" implies the sensor, along with a microprocessor, makes the 
diagnostic decisions itself [6].  Of course, the weight and volume capacity of the 
system and LRU may determine just how "smart" a sensor can be. 
Sensor placement can also be a factor of interfering inputs.  External or internal 
"noise" associated with system operating conditions can contribute to false out-of­
tolerance readings or mask true out-of-tolerance signals.  This phenomena increases 
either  unjustifiable  removals or allows  for LRU failure  without prior  notice, 
respectively.  Placement for minimum interference or use of filters to eliminate excess 
noise can increase diagnosability without additional complexity. 
2.3.3 Design for Diagnosability 
While some systems incorporate microprocessors programmed to test and isolate 
faulty LRUS and even switch to backup devices, most require fault isolation provisions 
like accessible probes or connectors called test points.  Test points provide an interface 
between test equipment and the system for the purpose of diagnosis, adjustment, and 
monitoring of performance.  The provision of test points is governed by the level of 
LRU chosen and will usually not extend beyond what is  required to isolate the 
particular faulty LRU [4]. 31 
2.3.3.1 Testability 
To minimize the possibility of faults being caused by maintenance activities,  test 
points must be in standardized positions within the circuit buffered by capacitors and 
resistors to protect the system from misuse of test equipment. Enough  space should be 
provided to allow for test probes of the test equipment. As with BITE, reliability of the 
test equipment should be an order of magnitude better than the system.  Additional 
strategies to assess design effectiveness for testability can be found in Mil-Std-2165 
[24].  The standardization of probes reduces the amount of test equipment  as well as 
lessens the probability of having the wrong test gear.  It should be noted that additional 
unnecessary test points are likely to impair rather than improve system diagnosability 
and therefore must be chosen carefully in the design phase. 
2.3.3.2 Ease of maintenance 
Several design considerations can ease maintenance actions and improve 
diagnosability.  First, if at all possible, minimize maintenance in the first place.  For 
example, development of electronic fuel injection in automobiles has eliminated  the 
need to check the distributor condition [24]. 
Many additional items, similar to DFA (design for assembly) goals, reflect the 
human factor. 
Accessibility refers to fasteners and covers as well  as position of mounting 
relative to other parts.  Parts should be easily removable with features such as quick 
disconnect plugs  for hydraulic and  electrical  parts,  yet  technicians  should be 
discouraged from removing and checking easily exchanged items as a substitute for the 
correct diagnostic procedure.  This can be accomplished by the choice of connections 
of the particular LRU, which presents the classic trade-off between reliability  and 
maintainability. A high reliability LRU which is unlikely to require replacement could 32 
be connected by a wrapped joint, whereas a low reliability LRU could be connected by 
a less reliable plug and socket for quick exchange [4]. 
The amount of adjustment required during diagnosis  can be minimized by 
generous tolerancing during the design.  Guide holes for adjustment tools and visible 
displays are also helpful for avoiding damage  to the equipment and monitoring 
adjustment levels, respectively [4]. 
Design for off-line repair can increase the  use of spares,  but decreases 
downtime immensely.  Considerations here include the handling capacity and size of 
the LRU. Good handling requires lightweight parts with handles to avoid equipment 
damage as well as protect from sharp edges and high  voltage sources (even an 
unplugged module can hold dangerous charges  on capacitors) [4].  Generally, as the 
size of the LRU increases the reliability decreases and the cost of spares increases. 
Several ergonomic factors influence diagnosability based on performance aids 
and the environment.  Since the short term memory of a human has the capacity of 
only about 7 bits of information, designs should require  minimum tests for diagnosis 
and minimum  skill  [11].  Overminiaturization should be avoided  if  possible. 
Environmental conditions such as illumination, comfort, and safety in the form of body 
positions and stress generating factors like weather, heat,  vibration, and noise should 
all be an integral part of design considerations [4].  Figure 12 illustrates how stressors 
such as temperature can affect diagnosability. 
Figure 12. Effect of temperature on number of mistakes [24] 33 
A complete checklist of diagnosability design with respect to human factors can 
be found in reference 31. 
2.3.4 Selection of Designs 
Design selection, from the earliest stages of  concept development, should 
consider every slice of diagnosability improvement introduced in the previous sections. 
From the LRU to the entire system configuration, selection of particular designs can be 
optimized using techniques involving  life cycle costing based on historical and 
predicted data, mathematical prediction models based  on advances in diagnosability 
technology, and screening methods using prototype or production parts. 
As noted previously, life cycle costing provides essential comparisons between 
existing system architectures based on historical field data and  design phase concepts 
based on prediction techniques.  Using cost of diagnosability as the  common metric, 
the optimal system design can be chosen from a set of limited choices. 
Mathematical prediction models are used extensively to weigh the savings of 
discrete advances in diagnosability technology.  For instance, one study developed a 
mathematical model for predicting impact  on maintenance man-hours of on-board test 
equipment in the form of BITE for use in the conceptual design of aircraft including the 
USAF Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) [17].  The cost and performance penalty of 
incorporating BITE must be balanced or exceeded by  cost savings  in  support, 
manpower, and improvements in availability to justify incorporating this technology in 
the design. The life cycle costing mechanism available through the Boeing Company is 
called the DEPCOST (dependability cost) model. This model, available for use on the 
spreadsheet program Excel 4.0 or higher, incorporates all  parameters that affect the 
cost of an aircraft throughout its 20 year life cycle. 
If actual products are available for testing, screening based on reliability and 
diagnosability parameters can be accomplished using several techniques  including: 
screening by truncation of distribution tails based  on tolerance limits defined by a 34 
normal distribution; "interference" between  stress and strength distributions, again 
using normal distributions of environmental  stress and product strength to eliminate 
products where intersections occur; burn-in screening to identify and eliminate products 
with early failure mechanisms; and, linear screening which predicts early failures based 
on a weighted average of early life parameters. 
Selection of designs based on diagnosability promises to move today's products 
from  weighty/costly  add-ons  to  maintenance-friendly/efficient  machines  with 
diminishing costs. 35 
3.0 DESCRIPTION AND MODELING OF THE BOEING 737-300 BLEED AIR
 
CONTROL SYSTEM
 
This section introduces the bleed air control  system (BACS) including major 
LRUs and their indications.  The scope of the analysis and all assumptions  are 
explicitly stated for the system. Modeling of the system is accomplished  with the use 
of a failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) by Airesearch and  maintenance 
manuals provided by the Boeing Company. Failure combinations are incorporated in 
similar fashion to previous research (Clark,1993) for ease of comparison analysis and 
application of system metrics. Though the 737-300 is singled out in this research, all 
analyses and recommendations can be extended to the 400 and 500 models since they 
are exactly the same. 
3.1 Description of the Bleed Air Control System (BACS) 
The BACS consists of two identical sets (one per engine) of valves, controls, 
ducts, and a heat exchanger mounted in the engine nacelle area as shown in figures 13 
and 14. 
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Figure 13. 737-300 BACS component location  left view 36 
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Figure 14. 737-300 BACS component location  right view 
Each set of equipment automatically selects the  engine bleed air supply from 
either the low-stage (5th stage)  or high-stage (9th stage) bleed ports and regulates the 
pressure and temperature supplied to  the air-using systems such  as cabin  air 
conditioning, cargo heating, and anti-ice. 
Bleed air from the 5th and 9th stage  compressors is routed through a heat 
exchanger, called the precooler, where it is cooled with  air from the engine's fan. 
From the precooler, the air continues to the pneumatic manifold as shown in figure 15. 
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5th Stage 
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Figure 15. 737-300 BACS schematic 37 
Since bleed air must be delivered  to the pneumatic manifold within specific 
temperature and pressure ranges to prevent under/overheat  and under/overpressure 
conditions, a number of valve and control systems are used for regulation. 
During takeoff, climb, and most cruise  and hold conditions, the  pressure 
available from the 5th stage is adequate to meet the requirements of air supply used. 
During descent, approach, landing and taxi conditions 9th stage bleed air is required. 
The selection of the bleed supply is controlled by the high-stage valve (HPSOV) and 
the high-stage regulator (HSreg) setting.  The HPSOV is responsible for regulating and 
shutting off the flow of 9th stage engine bleed air in conjunction with signals from the 
remotely located HSreg which selects the proper bleed air stage as necessary to satisfy 
system requirements. The low pressure check valve (Check) permits the flow of 5th 
stage bleed air and prevents higher pressure air from the 9th stage from back flowing 
into the 5th stage. The pressure regulator and shutoff valve (PRSOV) limits bleed  air 
to a predetermined pressure level for the system.  Secondarily, the PRSOV works in 
conjunction with the 450°F thermostat (Thermo)  as a flow modulating valve to limit 
downstream temperature within a maximum upper temperature band based on signals 
from the Thermo.  A remotely located bleed air regulator (Breg) works with the 
PRSOV to control the output pressure to a maximum and incorporates an  overpressure 
switch which activates the PRSOV to close in the event of extreme bleed pressure. The 
precooler control valve (FAMV) controls the flow of fan cooling air to the bleed air 
precooler (PCLR). The FAMV modulates in response to pneumatic control  pressure 
signals from a remotely located precooler control valve sensor (PCLRsen) to maintain 
bleed air  temperature downstream of the precooler within a specified range.  The 
PCLR vents excess air to ambient  as do the HPSOV and PRSOV by incorporating 
pressure relief valves to provide additional actuator relief in  the event of transient 
overshoots. All components are connected by a series of ducts (duct). 
The BACS currently has five sensors, or indications, that are used to diagnose 
system failures.  These indications include 1) above normal  readings on an analog 
pressure gauge 2) below normal readings on an analog pressure gauge 3) bleed trip off 38 
light illumination 4) low cabin pressure on an analog pressure gauge, and 5) low cabin 
temperature on an analog temperature  gauge.  All subsequent analysis refer to these 
indications in the predeeding numerical order, e.g., bleed pressure hi & bleed trip off 
equals indication 13. 
3.2 Scope and Assumptions of BACS Analysis 
3.2.1 Scope 
The valves, controls, ducts, and systems making up the BACS and described in 
the previous section (parenthetically  denoted) are considered LRUs which  can be 
replaced on the repair line as the lowest physical level of replacement.  Each LRU 
provides a function for the system that can be measured.  The five indications listed 
provide the performance measures of each LRU individually and collectively depending 
on the mode of operation of the system. An example is the HPSOV providing pressure 
to the system measured by the analog pressure gauge on the pilot's overhead panel. 
The LRU, HPSOV in this case, is directly associated with an indication,  pressure in 
this case. The LRU to indication relationship is causal in direction. 
Each indication, though, does not necessarily imply a causal relationship to  an 
LRU unless  only  one LRU could  have  possibly  caused  the  indication--a 
distinguishability of one (section  2.3.2).  The process of diagnosis  is  one of 
determining the set of parameters,or LRUs, of a system that have parameter measures, 
or indications, that fall outside the desired (or necessary) design values. This indication 
to LRU relationship is diagnostic in direction, and the resulting set of suspect LRUs are 
called candidates [11]. 
The scope of BACS model is to define the LRU/indication relationships in such 
a way as to incorporate all LRUs and indications in the  system as well as all modes of 
failure of each LRU.  Successful completion of the model allows  for systematic 39 
changes to be incorporated and analyzed.  Assumptions are made to simplify the 
analysis and to provide consistency with a real system. 
3.2.2 Assumptions 
As opposed to previous research,  this analysis incorporates  all  operating 
conditions of the aircraft at once since the information from all engine output 
conditions is realistically available to maintenance personnel.  To move beyond the 
trivial, proper electrical power is assumed to be available to the system, a failure that 
has no indication associated with it is not considered, and an indicator failure is not 
considered since the flight crew can establish its validity.  Failure of circuit protection 
is not considered. Valve port leakage and external leakage are not considered. 
Only one LRU failure at a time is considered, i.e., mutually exclusive, though 
an analysis technique for dependent LRU failures (passive) is developed. All ducting is 
considered to be one LRU. The failure rates experienced based on the FMEA and 
Boeing's Dependability Cost (DEPCOST) model are in the same proportion as those 
predicted.  Failure modes obtained from the FMEA for the BACS are the only failure 
modes considered.  Maintenance  is  performed  in  accordance with  established 
maintenance procedures and by personnel possessing appropriate skills and training. 
Inputs  to  the BACS model are obtained through design  standards and 
engineering judgment if not stated explicitly by the Airesearch FMEA or Boeing 
publications. 
3.3 Modeling of the Bleed Air Control System (BACS) 
Failure mode information is available from the FMEA conducted on the 737­
300 BACS including probability assessments for each mode of failure.  Mean time 
between failures for each LRU is available from a completed DEPCOST model based 40 
on historical data and maintenance reviews for the system as well.  Since an LRU can 
fail in several ways, a "sometimes" indication developed to exhibit relations between 
failures and indications that only sometimes promote failure indications. The fault tree 
analysis model of the BACS shown in figure 16 incorporates both always and 
sometimes relations depicted as solid and dashed lines, respectively.  Due to space 
constraints the LRU failures  (rectangles) are placed both above and below the 
indications (ovals). 
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Figure 16. Fault tree analysis model for the BACS 
With this defined system model, metrics can be developed to compare different 
systems that perform the same function by totally different designs or by reassigning 
LRU-indication relationships.  Refining previous research metrics (Clark,1993) to 
address dependent/passive failures and defining a prediction method to determine mean 
time between unscheduled removals (MTBUR) leads to a redesign methodology based 
on diagnosability.  Incorporating these prediction metrics into the life cycle costing 
mechanism DEPCOST model, total diagnosability cost savings can be discovered. 41 
4.0 DIAGNOSABILITY METRICS AND REDESIGN METHODOLOGY 
For diagnosability to be considered in the design/redesign process, there must 
be some way to predict how system changes will affect system parameters for 
comparing competing designs with respect to diagnosability. A methodology based on 
the prediction technique must be arrived at for use in determining what parts of the 
system should be changed to improve diagnosability. In section  4.1,  metrics from 
previous work are extended to measure the relative diagnosability of systems with LRU 
failures that are dependent/passive. A prediction metric based on unjustified removals 
and time is introduced in section  4.2.  A design change methodology is discussed in 
section 4.3. 
4.1 Dependent Failures 
As noted from previous work (Clark,  1993),  determining which LRUs are 
difficult to diagnose is not complex. By examining the fault tree analysis model of 
figure 16, a list of all possible failures and their corresponding candidates can be 
assembled.  It may seem that the greater number of times a certain LRU appears as a 
candidate, the harder it  is to diagnose.  Yet, if that particular candidate is the only 
candidate for many of its failure modes it does not present a diagnostic challenge at all. 
Moreover, even if a certain LRU is hard to diagnose, it may be of little concern if its 
failure is very unlikely to occur [11]. 
Taking the above factors into consideration, equation  12 of section 2.3.2 was 
modified to reflect the probability, or failure rate, of each particular LRU as shown in 
equation  14 as weighted distinguishability [11]. 42 
1 Z{.1) Fr(1 I  c)) 
WD =  (14) 
0-11 OZPF, 
1=1 
PF, is the probability of LRU failure as defined by equation 15. 
PF, = 1 Fla PC )  (15) 
candidates 
PC is the probability of failure of each of the candidate LRUs for a given indication. 
Weighted distinguishability,  like distinguishability,  varies from zero to one, but 
provides a more realistic approach to system diagnosis comparisons. 
Metrics defined up to this point have been derived from a mutually exclusive 
standpoint with respect to failures, i.e., only one LRU failure occurs at a time to 
produce a given failure indication.  Realistically, this is not always the case.  In fact, 
the 737-300 FMEA incorporates a section of passive LRU failures, that, in conjunction 
with certain other passive failures, activate a failure indication  therefore the LRU 
failures are dependent. 
Since merely the incidence of one passive failure will not generate a failure 
indication, the definition of PF,  for use in equation 14 should be expanded to 
incorporate dependent failures such as that depicted in the fault tree analysis model of 
figure 17 if one or more passive LRU failures are to be modeled. 
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Figure 17. Sample fault tree analysis including independent and dependent sources [101 43 
Equation 15 essentially defines the additive rule of probability. Incorporating a 
dependent passive event such as fault C in figure 17 requires the use of the 
multiplicative rule of probability. For such modeling, equation 16 is suggested for use 
in equation 14. 
PF,  fl (1- PC 3) 11 Pck,  fJ pck2  (16) 
candidates  candidates  candidates 
Once again, all PC terms are the probability of failures of each of the candidate LRUs 
for a given indication, yet based on dependency. PC, is independent, PC, has an 
"embedded" dependency, and PCk2 has an "extended" dependency. Figure 17 models 
an extended dependency of fault C.  Though, if the "and" and "or" gates were 
switched, the dependency would be embedded between faults A and B. Of course, the 
PCk terms are only utilized if the model embodies them, otherwise they are discarded 
and equation 15 suffices. 
Though the analysis of the passive failures in the 737 BACS system is not 
included in the scope of this research,  weighted distinguishability can now be applied 
to virtually any system modeled by fault tree analysis. 
4.2 Mean Time Between Unscheduled Removals (MTBUR) 
Attributed by Boeing as the "single most important input" in the DEPCOST 
model, MTBUR has been targeted by this research as the overriding prediction 
parameter of diagnosability. For an aircraft system, MTBUR is defined as the average 
number of unit flight hours occurring between unscheduled removals of an LRU. 
Mathematically, it is the inverse of the LRU removal rate.  Reliability mathematics and 
labor time are the key contributors to the derivation of the predicted MTBUR based on 
LRU failure rates and system structure. 44 
Though the normal distribution is capable of describing most mechanical part 
lives,  the scheduled maintenance overhaul and replacement times are assumed to be 
within the middle portion of the curves shown in figure 6 of section 2.2.1.  Therefore, 
the exponential distribution of equation 9 is used in all subsequent analysis--assuming a 
constant, or near constant, failure rate. The structure of a system is most readily 
evaluated in terms of times to complete maintenance actions.  The assumption of 
constant working conditions in the context of human factors as well as proper 
experience and training are made.  Equation 2 is used to define mean time between 
failures (MTBF) to avoid redundancy in the calculations by accounting for existent 
false alarms.  The analysis also assumes a certain degree of maintenance technician 
knowledge prior to diagnosis based on the principle of optimum checking order 
(equation 10). In this case the cost factor is in the form of line labor hours. 
From a generic FMEA a fault tree analysis model can be assembled to include 
the failure rate of not only the LRU, but also the mode in which it fails.  Therefore, a 
particular failure indication rate can be assessed by summing the failure rates of all 
LRUs with a common indication: 
fai/rateLRU, ind = fadrateindi  (17) 
i=1 
given Ind,  is the common indication.  Since maintenance technicians work in the 
diagnostic direction,  this indication failure rate is a necessary starting point. 
In the science of diagnostics an LRU will be removed in one of two conditions: 
failed or not failed. Removal in the failed condition can be predicted directly from the 
reliability of the LRU and is justified.  Removal in the not failed condition, or 
unjustified removal, is a function of the probability of detecting the wrong LRU and 
the time it will take to repair it as well as how often the other LRU candidates for that 
indication fail.  Equation 18 defines the prediction metric for total MTBUR of an LRU. 
MTBURio, =11(11 MTBUR,,+11 MTBUR,)  (18) 45 
MTBUR, is the mean time between justified unscheduled removals of an LRU and is 
equal to the MTBF of that particular LRU.  MTBUR,, is the mean time between 
unjustified unscheduled removals defined by the mean time between failures of all other 
candidate LRUs (MTBF_,)divided by the probability of detecting the particular LRU 
in question (PD, ): 
MTBUR, MTBF,_,/ 
/ PD,  (19) 
where PD, is defined by 
PC
PD = 
ind3 
(LLHPR + SLHPR)  (20) 
where PC, ind  is the probability of a particular LRU failing in a mode that incites a 
given failure indication (generated from failrateLRU,indication,), LLHPR is the line 
labor hours per removal of the particular LRU, and SLHPR is the shop labor hours per 
removal of the particular LRU. Both time variables are retrieved from maintenance log 
books and historical data. 
For a complete prediction of the total MTBUR of a particular LRU in a system, 
equation 19 is inverted for each indication to find the unjustified removal rate and then 
added to the others to find the total unjustified removal rate of the particular LRU. The 
total unjustified removal rate is then inverted to find the total MTBUR which is 
applied to equation 18.  Examples of the MTBUR predictions are found in section 5.0 
as well as a detailed spreadsheet analysis located in appendix B. 
4.3 Design Change Methodology 
The MTBUR prediction metric serves as a standard for change when comparing 
competing designs.  Analogous to the Service Modes Analysis (SMA) developed as a 46 
methodology for design changes based on serviceability [12], design/redesign based on 
the MTBUR prediction metric should focus the following system changes: 
1. LRUs with a high A and low MTBUR. 
2. LRUs with high spare costs. 
3. LRUs included with highly ambiguous indications (high c). 
4. LRUs with room for improvement (MTBF MTBUR  10000hrs). 
5. Candidate combinations that will increase the "overall" system MTBUR, 
(especially the MTBUR of high cost LRUs) 
6. Indications with a high failure rate (failrateind ). 
Feasibility of system changes in terms of complexity of LRUs and their functions 
should also be noted for cost optimality. 
The MTBUR prediction metric can be applied to any system with a fully 
defined fault tree analysis model and design change can be implemented based on the 
preceding discussion.  Diagnosability comparisons and ultimately cost comparisons 
prove significant gains in insight for analysis based on this technique. 47 
5.0 APPLICATION AND EVALUATION OF MTBUR PREDICTION METRIC
 
The procedures introduced in the previous sections allow the designer to 
accurately model an existing system to shed light on which LRUs are a source of 
diagnosability problems. The designer can also incorporate system changes and see 
precisely how time and cost are affected.  For the BACS, the PRSOV is a known 
diagnostic challenge due to its historical high rate of unjustifiable removals.  Previous 
work (Clark,  1993) suggests a comparison of metrics such as C; from equation 11 to 
identify components, like the PRSOV, with potential diagnosability problems and then 
an application of equation 14 to find a weighted distinguishability for modified systems 
to see if an improvement is achieved.  Application of the MTBUR prediction metric 
allows for an immediate evaluation of not only which LRUs pose a threat to 
diagnosability, but which improvements in diagnosability are feasible. 
The current  737 BACS design is the testing ground for the MTBUR prediction 
metric in section  5.1.  Section  5.2 applies the design change suggestions of section  4.3 
to develop several redesigns of the system. An evaluation based on MTBUR changes 
and cost savings is presented along with recommendations in section 5.3.  Section  5.4 
addresses the issue of spares provisioning. 
5.1 Application of MTBUR prediction to the original 737 BACS 
As stated earlier, only active/independent failures will be analyzed which make 
up the vast majority of unjustifiable removals (over 90%).  From the fault tree analysis 
model of figure 16, section  4.2 metrics can be applied for each LRU to arrive at a 
predicted MTBUR. An example spreadsheet of the original system analysis for the 
PRSOV is located in appendix B. Using the DEPCOST model for historical values of 
each LRUs MTBUR, an evaluation of the prediction metric may be accomplished. 
Table 2 includes values of historical versus predicted MTBUR. 48 
LRU  HISTORICAL  PREDICTED 
HPSOV  36018  38931 
PRSOV  5394  6789 
PCLR  65758  76841 
duct  11000  11827 
FAMV  16421  27123 
CHECK  309102  319140 
HSreg  10985  15659 
PCLRsen  15168  24106 
Breg  11607  16700 
Thermo  13799  89645 
Table 2. Historical versus predicted MTBUR 
Several LRUs (HPSOV, Breg, and duct) had no MTBUR listed.  Based on 
engineering judgment, these LRUs were assigned an MTBUR equal to twice their 
historical mean time between failures (MTBF).  Other omitted items include the 
SLHPR and spares cost of the Breg and HPSOV which are estimated at values of 
similar equipment (HSreg and PRSOV values, respectively, varying slightly due to 
complexity differences). The predicted values fall within approximately twenty percent 
of the true values with the exception of the 450°F thermostat. This anomaly could be 
explained by organizational factors outside the scope of this research, e.g., direction 
from higher levels because of low spares cost, ease of maintenance, least SLHPR, or 
merely politics, since the LRU should last much longer based on its failure rate. 
The ultimate evaluation involves comparing the cost of the true versus historical 
system using the DEPCOST model directly. A comparison of cost and MTBUR can be 
accomplished by viewing figures 18 and 19.  These figures are constructed by 
modifying the MTBUR input column of the DEPCOST model to reflect first historical 
values and then predicted values of MTBUR. The 450°F thermostat is extracted from 
subsequent analysis due to the assumed organizational factors mentioned earlier as well 
as the LRU impotency with respect to overall cost savings compared to all other LRUs 
in the system. It should be noted that in all DEPCOST analyses only one spare per 
LRU is considered to gain savings per unit LRU. M
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Figure 20. DEPCOST model of predicted MT13URs 51 
Figures 18 and 19 validify the MTBUR prediction metric.  Not only are 
predicted MTBURs and costs within an acceptable range of historical values, but order 
is preserved with respect to both candidates for diagnosability problems and cost 
drivers. With this information, the choice of LRUs and functions for redesign can be 
easily made. 
Since no passive failures are addressed in this research one would anticipate a 
higher predicted MTBUR and therefore a lower cost than the historical values as 
figures 18 and 19 illustrate. A sample DEPCOST model spreadsheet can be found in 
appendix C (for analysis, all information not pertaining to this research is extracted). 
5.2 System Modification and Comparison 
All redesigns are based on not only diagnosability improvements, but also on 
cost savings since as noted in section 2.0, cost is always the common denominator. 
Seven design modifications are studied and evaluations for each based on feasibility and 
logic are given in accordance with the design/redesign methodology discussed in 
section 4.3.  The benchmark for all design comparisons is the original design using 
predicted values of MTBUR for continuity.  A sample spreadsheet analysis and 
DEPCOST illustration for each change is located in appendix C. 
5.2.1 Change 1--Remove Pressure Function from PRSOV 
Since the PRSOV was a point of interest in previous research involving the 747­
400 BACS, and apparently is in the present analysis as well, the most successful system 
change suggested in that analysis (Clark, 1993) is incorporated in the first modification. 
This change follows all suggestions found in section 4.3 and involves essentially 
removing the pressure regulating function of the PRSOV. 52 
Like the temperature control function, the pressure control function of the 
PRSOV is shared by other LRUs. In this case, the pressure is regulated directly at the 
high and low pressure ports instead of at the junction of the two just prior to the 
precooler.  This change requires the check valve to be replaced by a control valve. 
Also, the Breg must then be moved to the new control valve to monitor downstream 
pressure and signal a bleed trip off indication in the event of an overpressurization. 
Based on benchmark MTBUR and cost, change 1 increases the MTBUR for the 
PRSOV by 51 percent, decreases the MTBUR for the check valve by 79 percent, and 
slightly decreases the MTBUR for the Breg.  Since the check valve is converted to a 
control valve, the failure rate of its counterpart control valve, the HPSOV, is assigned 
to the check valve bringing its MTBUR down exponentially.  Since the check valve is 
more resistant to cost change than the PRSOV due to labor time and ambiguity, overall 
cost is in favor of the PRSOV. The cost savings for this system change is on the order 
of 8 percent--a significant amount based on the size and complexity of an aircraft 
system. 
The feasibility of this design change can be approached from two directions. 
The number of LRUs remains constant, and hence the complexity does not increase nor 
do the functional requirements change drastically. Even the relationship of the Breg is 
not significantly altered since it was remotely located from the PRSOV anyway.  Yet, 
considering the limited amount of space available in this particular system, any change 
in size and complexity at the LRU level could be restrictive, i.e., making the check 
valve a control valve.  Also, keeping the bleed trip off functional relationship with the 
PRSOV requires an additional control line from the Breg. 
For an original design for future aircraft (737-600,700,800...) change 1  is a 
feasible and logical design to address the unjustifiable removal problem, but a "quick 
fix" for current aircraft it is not. 53 
5.2.2 Change 2--Add PRSOV Closed. Sensor Light 
Once again, the methodology suggestions of section 4.3 are heeded and the 
PRSOV is targeted once more.  Using an existing design modification based on the 
747-400 BACS design, a PRSOV closed sensor light/indication is added to the system 
to arrest the unjustifiable removals of at least that particular LRU. Since 70 percent of 
the PRSOV failure modes are in the closed position,  this modification promises 
significant impact. 
Basically, this modification entails simply adding a limit switch type sensor to 
give the aircraft crew, and thus troubleshooting personnel, an indication when the valve 
is in its closed position (indication 6 for analysis).  Thus, if an indication 2 (bleed 
pressure low) occurs without an indication 6 (PRSOV closed) then a PRSOV failure 
can be discounted.  This decrease in ambiguity of indication 2, which is the most 
ambiguous, should aid in overall system diagnosability. 
Based on the benchmark, MTBUR of the PRSOV increases by 34 percent and 
all other MTBURs increase slightly as well with the exception of the check valve's 
decreasing slightly because of the system metric dynamics (the ambiguity of the check 
valve's only indication, 2, mandates an increase in false detections of low failure rate 
LRUs with a decrease in number high failure rate candidates).  Overall cost savings is 
approximately 7 1/2 percent. 
This modification exemplifies the age old battle between BITE and increased 
weight and complexity.  Modern sensors have a reliability of at least an order of 
magnitude above that of the parent system and weigh as little as a dime, yet even the 
slightest increase in weight and complexity can substantially increase cost in terms of 
fuel and assembly hours--especially for aircraft systems.  From the human factors 
standpoint,  there  is  a point of diminishing returns on information available to 
crewmembers in the form of indications, but since this indication is continuous and can 
be recorded, reaching that point from this indication is doubtful. 
Since so many system variables comprise fuel saving strategies, the cost benefit 
seems to be in favor of increased weight based on the amount of savings this change 54 
produces.  Even in this particular system, there is always enough room under the 
cowling for "just one more sensor". 
5.2.3 Change 3--Add Indication 3 to PRSOV 
Targeting the PRSOV once again since it appears to have the most room for 
improvement, the function-indication relationship is modified to decrease the ambiguity 
of indication 2 in much the same way as adding a sensor. 
Some type of relationship with existing indications or LRUs and the PRSOV is 
sought after because of the high failure rate of the PRSOV in the closed position. 
Considering the bleed trip off light illuminates whenever a bleed trip occurs and a bleed 
trip closes the PRSOV in the case of overheat or overpressure, an association is already 
in place. Merely running the bleed trip off light (indicator 3)  wire from the PRSOV 
closed position instead of the overheat/overtemperature probes which currently signal 
the indication not only reduces the ambiguity of indication 2, but maintains system 
integrity by changing no functions and adding no sensors.  This modification simply 
changes the PRSOV failed closed indication from indication 2 to indication 23. 
The MTBUR for the PRSOV increases by 29 percent and slightly increases for 
the HSreg, duct, Breg, HPSOV, and PCLR primarily due to the decrease in ambiguity 
of indication 2 which these LRUs share.  All other LRU MTBURs decrease slightly 
due to associations with both indications 2 and 3 (except for the check valve whose 
MTBUR decreases for the same reason stated in section 5.2.2) which the PRSOV is 
now associated with.  The overall cost savings for this modification is almost 6 1/2 
percent. 
This modification seems very feasible due mainly to its simplicity.  According 
to Boeing publications the bleed trip off light is incited by an overpressure ( >180 ± 10 
psi) at the inlet of the PRSOV which is monitored by an overpressure switch inside the 
remotely located Breg. The indication is also incited by an overheat ( > 490°±10°F) out 55 
of the precooler which is monitored by an overheat switch just downstream of the 
precooler.  This change would replace two wires running from the switches with one 
wire running only from the PRSOV to the bleed switch off light. A drawback would 
be an apparent need to install a limit switch sensor in the PRSOV to monitor its 
position and relay the message to the indication, therefore adding a sensor like change 2 
but not decreasing the ambiguity as much as a separate indication might. 
Overall, this design mentality is logical.  Scrutiny reveals that complexity is 
even reduced if the bleed trip off light signal wires are removed from the Breg 
overpressure and overtemperature switches.  Of course, a modification like this may 
take more hours of overhaul than desired.  In addition, even though indication 2 
decreases in ambiguity, indication 23 increases in ambiguity.  In light of the above 
discussion, change 3 promises to be a sound design. 
5.2.4 Change 4--Add Indication 3 to PRSOV and FAMV 
From the original DEPCOST analysis it appears that besides the PRSOV, the 
FAMV is next in line for room for possible improvement based on the suggestions of 
section 4.3.  Since the FAMV already has a sometimes relationship with indication 3, 
making it a hard failure (always relationship) does not seem out of the question. 
From a mechanical standpoint, whenever the FAMV fails in the closed position, 
the PCLR will not receive any cooling air from the engine fan.  This should cause an 
overheat condition an overwhelming majority of the time. A wire and probably a limit 
switch sensor must be added to the FAMV to incite the bleed trip off light whenever a 
failure occurs. This modification is applied in conjunction with the modification in the 
previous section for analysis purposes. 
From the original benchmark, the MTBUR of the PRSOV increases by 22 
percent.  All other LRUs are affected in the approximately the same manner and same 
degree as the previous change. Even, the MTBUR of the FAMV is decreased slightly. 
The overall cost savings is almost 6 percent--less than that of change 3 alone. 56 
The faulty logic in this redesign is that it increases the failure rate of an already 
high failure rate indication (23) at least as much as it decreases the failure rate of an 
already improved indication (2).  Thus nullifying any gains previously made.  Also, 
even though the FAMV has much room for improvement, it does not have much room 
in the particular failure mode targeted (only 30 percent of all failures are in the closed 
mode).  From a mechanical standpoint, the same arguments apply as those given 
against modification 3, but twofold since another sensor must be added. 
Not only must an LRU with a high potential for improvement be targeted, but 
the particular failure mode that causes most of its  failures must be addressed. 
Modification 4 is not recommended. 
5.2.5 Change 5--Add PRSOV Closed & FAMV Open Sensors 
The lesson learned from the previous section is applied by combining change 2 
from the 747 design to a sensor addition on the FAMV. The open position of the 
FAMV valve along with the closed position of the PRSOV is targeted by adding two 
sensors to the system. 
In addition to the PRSOV modification discussed in section 5.2.2, a limit switch 
sensor must be added to monitor the failed open position of the FAMV which accounts 
for 70 percent of its failures.  These two sensors decrease the ambiguity of two 
ambiguous indications (2 and 5) while increasing the diagnosability of the two highest 
cost drivers. 
The MTBURs of the PRSOV, PCLRsen, and FAMV are significantly increased 
while those of the HSreg, duct. Breg, and HPSOV are increased slightly.  The PCLR 
and check MTBURs are decreased slightly due to their increase in probability of false 
detection which influences cost little. The overall cost savings is over 10 percent. 
The BITE versus weight and complexity conflict  arises  again  for  this 
configuration. The cost analysis of added weight is not included in this research, but it 
is doubtful cost would encroach upon the savings realized by two lightweight sensors. 57 
5.2.6 Change 6--Add PRSOV Closed & FAMV Stuck Sensors 
Iterating the previous change one more step to arrest all unjustifiable removals 
of the FAMV, a "stuck" sensor added in lieu of a stuck open sensor. The FAMV is 
the second highest cost LRU in terms of replacements and definitely a cost driver in 
terms of diagnosability so this modification is analyzed with optimism. 
Preferably, a stuck sensor would be no more complex than a single limit switch. 
Since the LRU in question consists of a butterfly valve, a sensor placed on the axis of 
the valve could monitor any movement, or lack thereof.  No additional sense lines 
would be necessary from the previous modification.  Worst case, two limit switches 
(open and closed) would be required. 
The analysis shows significant increases in all LRU MTBURs especially the 
PRSOV (34 percent) and FAMV (25 percent). The overall cost savings is 12 percent. 
By virtually eliminating all unjustifiable removals of the FAMV (reducing 
MTBUR to MTBF of the LRU), a relatively simple modification realizes almost twice 
the savings as the 747 design. 
5.2.7 Change 7--Add PRSOV & FAMV Stuck Sensors 
The final modification of this analysis iterates the previous modification one 
more time by incorporating a "stuck" sensor of both the PRSOV and FAMV. This 
modification  essentially  eliminates  all  unjustifiable  removals  of the two  least 
diagnosable/highest cost drivers in the pneumatic system. 
Both the PRSOV and FAMV incorporate butterfly-type valves for their 
operation so both could be fitted with the same "stuck" sensor mentioned in section 
5.2.6. Once again, complexity is not increased to a great extent and added weight does 
not seem to threaten feasibility. 58 
Based on the benchmark once more, all LRU MTBURs realize a rather 
tremendous increase: PRSOV 65 percent; PCLRsen 54 percent; FAMV 25 percent; and 
all others over 3 percent. The overall cost savings is over 16 percent. 
This change is recommended over all other changes due to its simplicity and 
ease of retrofitting current aircraft designs. Information from the Boeing company and 
the Federal  Aviation Administration (FAA) implies bigger cost savings realized on 
sensor-based modifications rather than complete component overhaul do to certification 
practices.  Change 7 of the BACS MTBUR based research analysis possesses the 
confident expectation of most cost-benefit and least retrofit time loss. A summary of 
modification results based on predicted diagnosability cost is shown in table 3. 
Original design cost = $85,715 
DESIGN  COST  % SAVINGS 
Change 1  $78,673  8.2 
Change 2  $79,316  7.5 
Change 3  $80,187  6.5 
Change 4  $80.696  5.9 
Change 5  $77,032  10.1 
Change 6  $75,293  12.2 
Change 7  $71,715  16.3 
Table 3. Cost analysis of modifications. 
5.3 Spares Provisioning 
All prior cost analyses consider only the cost per unit LRU. The DEPCOST 
model includes a spares holding cost found by equation 21. 
i(1 +i)4'dge
4iaresHoltirNahl  1\4 oixyArres x ( 'r)stPalyzrelilli  +SixresHlafq..factor  (21)
+i)4've 1/ 
where i = (MARR-Inflation Rate)/(1 +Inflation Rate). 59 
If the number of spares is found using a Poisson distribution with a spares 
availability of 95 percent,  a change in LRU MTBUR is likely to have an impact on 
overall diagnosability cost. 
The Boeing Company's algorithm for computing the number of spares is based 
on the Poisson expansion of 
iRe-N)* (NZ )I  i! > fillrate(0.95)  (22) 
where e is the natural logarithmic base, r+1 is the number of required spares to satisfy 
the fill rate, and N is found from equation 23. 
N = QPA * FlightHours * TurnDays * RR / 365  (23) 
where QPA is the quantity per airplane, FlightHours is the fleet size multiplied by the 
average flight hours per airplane in one year, the TurnDays is the time in the shop (14 
days for electrical components and 30 days for mechanical components), and RR is the 
removal rate which is the inverse of MTBUR. An increase in MTBUR should decrease 
the cost of the system since it is inversely proportional to the number of spares, and 
therefore the holding cost. 
Incorporating the required number of spares for the system, an overall system 
cost comparison can be made. Table 4 presents a summary of the modification results 
to include the cost of actual spares provisioning. 
Original design cost = $122,258 
DESIGN  COST  % SAVINGS 
Change 1  $112,443  8.0 
Change 2  $113,085  7.5 
Change 3  $115,343  5.7 
Change 4  $115,852  5.2 
Change 5  $107,651  12.0 
Change 6  $105,912  13.4 
Change 7  $102,334  16.3 
Table 4. Cost analysis of modifications including spares provisioning. 60 
Actual spares provisioning reveals less savings for changes 3 and 4, but an 
increase in savings for changes 5 and 6.  The majority of cost savings from the 
decrease in the number of required spares is due to the PRSOV and FAMV, falling 
directly in line with the redesign methodology of section 4.3. 61 
6.0 CONCLUSION
 
The growing life cycle cost dependency of quality products is prompting design 
engineers to meet product specifications with diagnosability as a major ingredient. This 
research has addressed diagnosability analysis for mechanical systems quantitatively by 
means of LRU-indication relationships.  These relationships, along with structure 
which is defined by maintenance time, essentially determine the diagnosability of a 
system.  As system LRU functions and indications are modified, diagnosability also 
changes based on the reliability of each LRU and the ambiguity of each indication. 
The MTBUR of each system LRU is a direct measure of diagnosability.  A 
generic metric was developed to predict LRU MTBURs for any system made up of 
several LRUs that give some indication of failure. The MTBUR of a particular LRU is 
directly related to the probability of detecting that particular LRU and its time to repair 
given a failure indication including other LRUs. The value of MTBUR for each LRU 
can be compared to that of other LRUs to determine which ones present a diagnostic 
challenge. System changes based on this information can then be made to decrease the 
cost of diagnosability. 
The MTBUR prediction metric was applied to the 737 BACS to determine 
system improvements. LRU evaluation presented the PRSOV and FAMV as primary 
candidates for diagnosability improvement.  The life  cycle costing mechanism, 
DEPCOST model, was used to evaluate  system cost based on the diagnosability 
parameters of unjustified removals, spares cost, and maintenance time.  Seven design 
changes were suggested and analyzed based on MTBUR, cost, and feasibility.  These 
redesigns modify LRU indications by optimizing current indications or by adding 
sensors to strategic LRUs.  Evaluations of the redesigns revealed an improvement in 
diagnosability directly impacting the cost of the system. 
Quality through diagnosability cannot be neglected in today's marketplace. 
With cost as the common metric for design evaluation, and analysis factors contributing 
to extensive downtime costs, design for diagnosability should be more than mere 62 
happenstance considered  after  the product  is  launched.  The relationships  of 
diagnosability developed here can be directly compared with other common design 
decision-making variables such as manufacturability and ease of assembly in the arena 
of life cycle costing.  The direction of future research is expected to address the 
structure of designs explicitly in terms of maintenance hours.  This will especially 
enhance prediction techniques of systems with a lack of historical data. 63 
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APPENDIX A
 Diagnosability Analysis Tools 
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Frequency-Based Vibration Troubleshooting Checklist 
Vibration  Possible
 
Frequency  Cause  Comments
 
_.. 1 x Rpm	  Imbalance  Steady phase that follows the transducer. Can be caused by load variation. 
material buildup, or pump cavitation. 
Misalignment  High axial levels. 180-deg phase relation at the shaft ends. Usually accompanied 
or bent shaft  by high 2 x rpm frequency. 
Strain  Caused by casing or foundation distortion, or from attached structures (e.g., piping). 
Looseness  Directional; changes with transducer location. Usually accompanied by high 
harmonic content and random phase. 
Resonance  Caused by attached structures: drops off sharply with change of speed. 
Electrical  Broken rotor bar in induction motor. Often accompanied by sidebands of 
2 x motor slip frequency. 
2 x rpm	  Misalignment  High levels of axial vibration.
 
or bent shaft
 
I Harmonic	  Looseness  Large number of harmonic: impulsive or truncated time waveform 
i  Rubbing  Shaft contacting macnine housing. 
Sub-rpm	  04 whirl  Unstable phase: typically 0.43 to 0.48 of rpm. 
RPM  Ball Diameter Bearings  Fundamental Train  =	 
1  x  ft  x COS contact angle]
2  60  Pitch Diameter 
N x rpm	  Rolling  0Ba lis  RPM  ,  Ball Diameter
Inner race =  x  (1+  x COS contact angle] element  2  60  Pitch Diameter 
bearings 
OBalts  x 
RPM 
[1  Ball Diameter  . Outer race =	  x COS contact angle]
2  60  Pitch Diameter 
Pitch Diameter  RPM  Ball Diameter Ball defect =2  x  (I  (  x (COS contact angleMI x Ball Diameter  Prtch Diameter 
Usually modulated by running speed. 
Gears  Gearmesh (tteeth x RPM); usually modulated by running speed.
 
Belts  Belt x running speed and 2 x running speed.
 
Blades/vanes  1'611K:es/vanes X rpm; usually present in a normally-running machine.
 
Harmonics indicate that a problem exists_ 
Resonance	  A number of possible sources, including shaft, casing, foundation, and attached 
structures_ frequency is proportional to stiffness and inversely proportional 
to mass. Run-up tests and modal analysis are useful in diagnosis. 
(Ad 4{7(yd from CT...tel.-.*l flunk:hod by OU Engi.r.00ring Corp.) 
Figure A2. FFT troubleshooting checklist 70 
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MTBUR Calculations 
LRU  fail rate  MTBF  PC  LLHPR  SLHPR 
hpsov  13.882  72035.73 0.0013882  4.5  4.64  737-300,400,500 
prsov  89.135  11218.94 0.0089135  3.05  4.64 
pclr  8.804  113584.7 0.0008804  4  10  prsov 
duct  45.455  21999.78 0.0045455  4  2  i= 89.135 
famv  29.578  33808.91 0.0029578  7.66  8.92 
check  1.34  746268.7 0.000134  4  1.8 
HSreg  37.67  26546.32 0.003767  3.13  5.38 
PCLRsensor  16.805  59506.1  0.0016805  2.24  1.53 
Breg  43.077  23214.24 0.0043077  9.94  5.38 
Thermo  9.058  110399.6 0.0009058  4.15  1.39 
sum FRs per ird  of comfidates  PC:4-4PRi norrnof lifealmt.:wr I 46 sum FRn-FRilind 1 /F Rn-1  IAT8Fn-ilP0i  INTBURiun1.6 
Indication  candidates  failrateind Ci  PDi  MTBFind failraten-i MTBFn-i  MTBURi-u failratei-u 
1  h,pr,H,B  70.85485  4  0.470195 14113.36  44.11435 22668.36  48210.564  20.74234 
13  h,H  4.4611  2  224160  0  0  0 
2  h,pr,pc,d,f,c,H,P,B,T  151.756  10  0.418728 6589.525  89.3615 11190.5  26725.009  37.41813 
23  d,f,P  4.5919  3  217774.8  0  0  0 
24  pc,d  5.8661  2  170471  0  0  0 
245  pc,d  2.24405  2  445622.9  0  0  0 
25  pc,d  1.3493  2  741125  0  0  0 
3  d,T  9.0613  2  110359.4  0  0  0 
4  pc.d  2.71295  2  368602.4  0  0  0 
5  d,f,P  33.83175  3  29558.03  0  0  0 
LRU  indication  % of FR  failratepennd  LRU  indication % of FR  failrateperind 
hpsov  1  25  3.4705  famv  2  25  7.3945 
13  5  0.6941  23  5  1.4789 
2  70  9.7174  5  70  20.7046 
prsov  1  30  26.7405  check  2  100  1.34 
2  70  62.3945  HSreg  1  45  16.9515 
pclr  2  65  5.7226  13  10  3.767 
24  15  1.3206  2  35  13.1845 
245  10  0.8804  PCLRsen  2  25  4.20125 
25  5  0.4402  23  5  0.84025 
4  5  0.4402  5  70  11.7635 
duct  2  70  31.8185  Breg  1  55  23.69235 
23  5  2.27275  2  35  15.07695 
24  10  4.5455  Thermo  2  10  0.9058 
245  3  1.36365  3  90  8.1522 
25  2  0.9091 
3  2  0.9091 
4  5  2.27275 
5  3  1.36365 
Totals 
sum FRI.. coksren  IIT d FFIr- 1.6  turn FRiu column 1/F Rits '1.6  MT BF, 
Tot Failrate n-i  Tot MTBF n-i  failratei-u MTBUR i-u MTBUR i-j 
133.47585  7491.9919970541  58.16048 17193.807  11218.94 
1 AIAATBURun.14ATBURD 
Predicted MTBUR i  Historical MTBUR i 
6789.0747  5394 
Figure Bl.  Sample Quattro Pro MTBUR calculation spreadsheet 72 
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Kir 
89 135 
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11218.94 
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PCLRsensor  16 805  59506.1  0.0016805  2.24  1.53 
Breg  43 077  23214.24  0.0043077  9.94  5.38 
Thermo  9 058  110399.6  0.0009058  4.15  1.39 
sun nis pe...3  o canckahrs  KoMIDR, norm.  ins.ezt,ne 1.6  wroGR,P,,,,, 
Indication  candidates 
PHAri 
failrateind Ci
4 05  3 
PDi  MTBFind failraten-i 
23:  1 
MTBFn -i 
0 
MTBURi-u 
I 
failratei-un 
0 
13  661495  3  151172 7  0  0  0 
2  h.pc,d,f,H.P.E3 T  88.0215  8  11360 86  0  0  0 
23  cMP  4.5919  3  2177748  0  0  0 
24  Pc.d  5 8661  2  170471  0  0  0 
245  pc d  2 24405  2  445622.9  0  0  0 
25  pca  64 4379  4  0.964042  15518 82  2 0434  489380 4  507633 74  1 969924 
3  d T,pr  35 8018  3  0 68178 27931 56  9 0613  110359 4  161869 69  6 177809 
4  pc.d  2.71295  2  368602 4  0  0  0 
5  dIP  33 83175  3  29558 03  0  0  0 
LRU  indication  % of FR  fadratepennd  LRU  indication  % of FR  raor.iqpriria 
hpsov  1  25  3 4705  famv  2  25  7 3945 
13  5  0 6941  23  5  1 4789 
2  70  9 7174  5  70  20 7046 
prsov  3  30  26 7405  check  25  5  0 6941 
25  70  62 3945  HSreg  1  45  16 9515 
pclr  2  65  5.7226  13  10  3 767 
24  15  1 3206  2  35  13 1845 
245  10  0 8804  PCLRsen  2  25  4 20125 
25  5  0 4402  23  5  0 84025 
4  5  0 4402  5  7C  11 7635 
duct  2  70  31 8185  Breg  1  50  21 5385 
23  5  2 27275  13  5  2 15385 
24  10  4 5455  2  35  15 07695 
245  3  1 36365  Thermo  2  10  09058 
25  2  0 9091  3  90  8 1522 
3  2  09091 
4  5  2 27275 
5  3  1 36365 
Totals 
wm1Pwcmurn  MTFd. 
Tot Failrate n-i  Tot MTBF n-i  failratei-un MTBUR i-un MTBUR 
11 1047  90051 959980909  8 147733 122733 524 11218 94 
1,1..4iBILho 1.411511,40 
Predicted MTBUR  Historical MTBUR 
10279 3165  5394 
Figure C2. Spreadsheet calculation and DEPCOST illustration for change 1 75 
100000  $70,000 
90000  total cost 
80000 
$60,000 
$79,316 
70000  $50,000 
CL  60000 
$40,000 
CO  50000  O 
2  40000  $30,000 
30000  $20,000  f EMEEI MTBUR I 
20000 
10000  $10,000 
1-0-GRAND I 
0 
0 
CP  tj
J 
-0 
C 
2  > 0 
co  0 
$0  TOTAL I 
COST 
- 1 0 
a.  °­
LRU 
LRU  fail rate  MTBF  PC  LLHPR  SLHPR 
hpsov  13.882  72035.73  0.0013882  4.5  4.64  737-300.400.500 
prsov  89.135  11218.94  0.0089135  3.05  4.64 
pclr  8.804  113584.7  0.0008804  4  10  prsov 
duct  45.455  21999.78  0.0045455  4  2  i= 89.135 
famv  29.578  33808.91  0.0029578  7.66  8.92 
check  1.34  746268.7  0.000134  4  1.8 
HSreg  37.67  26546.32  0.003767  3.13  5.38  ch 2 
PCLRsensor  16.805  59506.1  0.0016805  2.24  1 53 
Breg  43.077  23214.24  0.0043077  9.94  5.38 
Thermo  9.058  110399.6  0.0009058  4.15  1 39 
...rift...  al cone..  PG.,. nom., Mat.* le5  sun C.FFImmcl  .1....  WITOnIPD  MAUR.' Ie6 
Indication  candidates  failrateind Ci  PDi  MTBFind failraten-i  MTBFri-i  MTBURi-u faikatei-un 
1  Itpr.H.13  70.85485  4  0 470195  14113 4  44 1144  22666 4  48210 56  20  14234 
136  11,F1  4.4611  2  224160  0  0  0 
2  ttpc,d,f .C.H.P,B.T  89.3615  9  11190 5  0  0  0 
236  0.1,  4.5919  3  217775  0  0  0 
24  oc.4  5.8661  2  170471  0  0 0 
245  pc4  2.24405  2  445623  0  0 0 
25  pc.d  1 3493  2  741125  0  0  0 
36  cir  9 0613  2  110359  0  0  0 
4  pcxl  2 71295  2  368602  0  0  0 
5  d.f.P.  33.83175  3  29558  0  0  0 
26  Pr  62.3945  1  1  16027 1  0 0  0  0 
LRU  indication  % of FR  r.iimiepenft4  LRU  indication % of FR  faikatepennd 
hpsov  1  25  3 4705  famv  2  25  7 3945 
136  5  0.6941  236  5  1 4789 
2  70  9.7174  5  70  20 7046 
prsov  1  30  26.7405  check  2  100  1.34 
26  70  62.3945  HSreg  1  45  16 9515 
poll.  2  65  5.7226  136  10  3 767 
24  15  1.3206  2  35  13 1845 
245  10  0.8804  PCLRsen  2  25  4 20125 
25  5  0.4402  236  5  0 84025 
4  5  0.4402  5  70  11 7635 
duct  2  70  31.8185  Breg  1  55  23 69235 
236  5  2.27275  2  35  15 07695 
24  10  4 5455  Thermo  2  10  0 9058 
245  3  1.36365  36  90  8 1522 
25  2  0.9091 
36  2  0.9091 
4  5  2.27275 
5  3  1 36365 
Totals 
IMO kn I 'Int  turn Fr., <num 1414,16  .78F. 
Tot Failrate n-i  Tot MTBF n-i  failratei-un MTBUR i-un MTBUR 
44 11435  22668 360748827 20 74234 48210 564 11218.94 
to INIMURvn 
Predicted MTBUR  Historical MTBUR i 
9101 0574  5394 
Figure C3. Spreadsheet calculation and DEPCOST illustration for change 2 76 
100000  $70,000 
90000	  total cost 
$60,000
80000	  $77,032 
70000  $50,000 
ce  60000 
$40,000 
Ca	  50000 
40000  $30,000 
30000  $20,000  MEE MTBUR I 
20000 
$10,000 10000 
--GRAND 0  $0  TOTAL  I >	 > 
< 
-1
0 
a)	  COST 
L.L.	  0_  Cl­
o_ 
LRU 
LRU  fail rate  MTBF  PC  LLHPR  SLHPR 
hpsov  13.882  72035.73  0.0013882  4.5  4.64  737-300,400,500 
prsov  89.135  11218.94  0.0089135  3.05  4 64 
pclr 
duct 
8.804 
45.455 
113584.7  0.0008804 
21999.78  0.0045455 
4 
4 
10 
2 
prsov 
i= 89.135 
famv  29.578  33808.91  0.0029578  7.66  8.92 
check  1.34  746268.7  0.000134  4  1.8 
HSreg  37.67  26546.32  0.003767  3.13  5.38  ch 3 
PCLRsensor  16.805  59506.1  0 0016805  2.24  1.53 
Breg  43.077  23214.24  0.0043077  9 94  5 38 
Thermo  9 058  110399.6  0 0009058  4 15  1.39 
surn ,Rs  ma  d  ,Cbt-CRsm: 1/e.e16 
Indication  candidates  failrateind Ci  PDi  MTBFind failraten-i  M TBFn -I  MTBURi -u  failratei-un 
hprj-113  70 8548  I  411  3  44 1  22668 4  82 0  34 
136  h.F1  4 4611  2  224160  0  0  0 
2  h.pc,(1.1.c.H.P.B T  89 3615  9  11190.5  0  0  0 
236  d.f.P  4 5919  3  217775  0  0  0 
24  pc4  5 8661  2  170471  0  0  0 
245  Pc.cl  2 24405  2  445623  0  0  0 
25  pc.c1  1 3493  2  741125  0  0  0 
36  d.T  9 0613  2  110359  0  0 
4  pcsi  2 71295  2  368602  0  0  0 
5  d.P  13 12715  2  76178  0  0  0 
26  pi  62 3945  1  1  16027 1  0  0  0  0 
57  t  20 7046  1  48298 4 
LRU  indication  % of FR  faikatepennd  LRU  indication  % of FR  ladfalepennd 
hpsov  1  25  3 4705  famv  2  25  7 3945 
136  5  0 6941  236  5  1 4789 
2  70  9 7174  57  70  20 7045 
prsov  1  30  26 7405  check  2  100  1 34 
26  70  62 3945  1-1Srec  1  45  16 9515 
pcIr  2  65  5 7226  136  10  3 767 
24  15  1 3206  2  35  13 1845 
245  10  0 8804  PCLRsen  2  25  4 20125 
25  5  0 4402  236  5  0 84025 
4  5  0 4402  5  70  11 7635 
duct  2  70  31 8185  Breg  1  55  23.69235 
236  5  2 27275  2  35  15 07695 
24  10  4 5455  Thermo  2  10  0 9058 
245  3  1 36365  36  90  8 1522 
25  2  0 9091 
36  2  0 9091 
4  5  2 27275 
5  3  1 36365 
Totals 
Illot "In. 1,6  1.0. FF. <olom  ,OF, 
Tot Failrate n -i  Tot MTBF n-i  failratei-un MTBUR i-un MTBUR i-1 
44 11435  22668 360748827 20 74234 48210 564 11218 94 
110.1,0,MM,, 
Predicted MTBUR i  Historical MTBUR 
9101 0574  5394 
Figure C4. Spreadsheet calculation and DEPCOST illustration for change 3 77 
100000  $70,000 
90000 
80000 
$60,000 
total cost 
$80,187 
70000  $50,000 
cc  60000  $40,000 
03  50000  0 
40000  $30,000 
30000  $20,000  MTBUR 
20000 
10000 
$10,000 
0 
0 
rn 
tj
7  FL'  m 
C  >
2  > 
O 
co 
-J 
0 
$0  --11 -GRAND 
TOTAL 
COST 
-.1  LI- o_ 
o_ 
0 
LRU 
LRU  fail rate  MTBF  PC  LLHPR  SLHPR 
hpsov  13.882  72035.73  0.0013882  4.5  4.64  737-300,400.500 
prsov  89.135  11218.94  0.0089135  3.05  4.64 
pclr  8.804  113584.7  0.0008804  4  10  prsov 
duct  45.455  21999.78  0.0045455  4  2  1=  89.135 
famv  29.578  33808.91  0.0029578  7.66  8.92 
check  1.3.4  746268.7  0.000134  4  1.8 
HSreg  37.67  26546.32  0.003767  3.13  5.38  ch 4 
PCLRsensor  16.805  59506.1  0.0016805  2.24  1.53 
Breg  43.077  23214.24  0.0043077  9.94  5.38 
Thermo  9.058  110399.6  0.0009058  4.15  1.39 
swn FRS per too  al candicteles  PCJ.G. nom. 101......, 1.6  sun CRn.CR41.0  'FRI,.  NIT$Fn.4.0  IMIBURnsrle6 
Indication  candidates  faitrateind Ci  PDi  MTBFind failraten-i  MTBFn-i  MTBURi-u failratei-un 
hpr.H.B 
13  h,H  4.4611  2  224160 
2  lux.d.f.c.H.P.8,T  89.3615  9  11190.5  0  0  0 
23  d,f,P,p,  66.9864  4  0.92153314928.4  4.5919  217774.8 236317.88 4.231588 
24  pcA  5.8661  2  170471  0  0  0 
245  pc,d  2.24405  2  445622.9  0  0  0 
25  pcA  1.3493  2  741125  0  0  0 
3  cl,T  9.0613  2  110359.4  0  0  0 
4  pc.d  2.71295  2  368602.4  0  0  0 
5  cl.f,P  33 83175  3  2955803  0  0  0 
LRU  indication  % of FR  failrateperind  LRU  indication % of FR  failrateperind 
hpsov  1  25  3.4705  famv  2  25  7,3945 
13  5  0.6941  23  5  1.4789 
2  70  9.7174  5  70  20.7046 
prsov  1  30  26.7405  check  2  100  1.34 
23  70  62.3945  HSreg  45  16.9515 1 
pclr  2  65  5 7226  13  10  3.767 
24  15  1 3206  2  35  13.1845 
245  10  0.8804  PCLRsen  2  25  4.20125 
25  5  0.4402  23  5  084025 
4  5  0 4402  5  70  11.7635 
duct  2  70  31.8185  Breg  55  23.69235 
23  5  2.27275  2  35  15.07695 
24  10  4.5455  Thermo  2  10  0.9058 
245  3  1.36365  3  90  8.1522 
25  2  0.9091 
3  2  0.9091 
4  5  2.27275 
5  3  1.36365 
1 
Totals 
sun a," coOnn  sum Mu caurn IFRiu le6  MIBFA 
Tot Failrate  Tot MTBF n-i  failratei-un MTBUR i-un MTBUR i-j 
48 70625  20531.245989991  24.97393 40041 755  11218.94 
14111.11BURen 1.013UN 
Predicted MTBUR i  Historical MTBUR i 
8763.55599  5394 
Figure CS. Spreadsheet calculation and DEPCOST illustration for change 4 78 
100000  $70,000 
90000  total cost 
$60,000
80000  $80,696 
70000  $50,000 
ix  60000 
$40,000 
co  50000  7/1
0 
$30,000 40000 
30000  $20,000  MEI MTBUR
20000 
$10,000 10000 
0  $0  GRAND 
rn  0)
 
a)  TOTAL 
w 2 
m`  of  COST 
a. 
LRU 
LRU  tail rate  MTBF  PC  LLHPR  SLHPR 
hpsov  13.882  72035.73  0.0013882  4.5  4.64  737-300,400.500 
prsov  89.135  11218.94  0.0089135  3.05  4.64 
pclr  8.804  113584.7  0.0008804  4  10  prsov 
duct  45.455  21999.78  0.0045455  4  2  i= 89.135 
famv  29.578  33808.91  0.0029578  7.66  8.92 
check  1.34  746268.7  0.000134  4  1.8 
HSreg  37.67  26546.32  0.003767  3.13  5.38  ch 5 
PCLRsensor  16.805  59506.1  0.0016805  2.24  1.53 
Breg  43.077  23214.24  0.0043077  9.94  5.38 
Thermo  9.058  110399.6  0.0009058  4.15  1.39 
s... FRS p.. .  at cr...  KALI, nom. ISaggene 1e6  tarn 661rISR6Ind  1FRru  1ITEIFn../161)  WW2., 166 
Indication  candidates  faitrateind Ci  PDi  MTBFind failraten-i MTBFn-i  MTBURi-u failratei-un 
h.pr,H.B  .8548  I 70 9  14113.  4  3  2668 36  48210. 6  0.1423 
13  il.f+  4.4611  2  224160  0  0  0 
2  h,pc,d.c.H,P.B.T  81 967  8  12200.03  0  0  0 
23  d.f.P.pr  74 3809  4  0.877104 13444.31  11.9864  83427.88 95117.413  10.51332 
24  pc.d  5 8661  2  170471  0  0  0 
245  pc.d  2.24405  2  445622 9  0  0  0 
25  pc.d  1.3493  2  741125  0  0  0 
3  0.7  9 0613  2  110359.4  0  0  0 
4  pc.d  2 71295  2  368602.4  0  0  0 
5  d.CP  33.83175 3  29558.03  0  0  0 
LRU  indication  % of FR  fadrateperind  LRU  indication % of FR  faileateperind 
hpsov  1  25  3 4705  fame 
13  5  0.6941  23  30  8.8734 
2  70  9.7174  5  70  20.7046 
prsov  1  30  26 7405  check  2  100  1.34 
23  70  623945  HSreg  1  45  16.9515 
pclr  2  65  5.7226  13  10  3.767 
24  15  1.3206  2  35  13.1845 
245  10  0.8804  PCLRsen  2  25  4.20125 
25  5  0.4402  23  5  0 84025 
4  5  0.4402  5  70  11 7635 
duct  2  70  31.8185  Breg  1  55  23.69235 
23  5  2 27275  2  35  15.07695 
24  10  4.5455  Thermo  2  10  0.9058 
245  3  1.36365  3  90  8.1522 
25  2  0.9091 
3  2  0.9091 
4  5  2.27275 
5  3  1.36365 
Totals 
tun GRnca r.  1/Tot FR, 1e6  cn IFRIu 166 son, 6666 Sr. MTH, 
Tot Failrate n-i  Tot MTBF n-i  failratei-un MTBUR i-un MTBUR i-j 
56 10075  17825.0736398355 31 25566 31994.201  11218 94 
Predicted MTBUR  Historical MTBUR 
8306 29192  5394 
Figure C6. Spreadsheet calculation and DEPCOST illustration for change 5 79 
100000  $70,000 
90000  total cost 
80000 
$60,000  $75,293 
70000  $50,000 
c 
03 
1-­ 2 
60000 
50000 
40000 
$40,000 
$30,000 
11)
0 
30000 
20000 
$20,000  li=2MTBUR 
10000  $10,000 
0  $0  GRAND 
0 
rn 
0) 
cu 
co 
15 
73 
C 
-J 
2 
-C 0 
TOTAL 
COST 
0 
0 
LRU 
LRU  fail rate  MTBF  PC  LLHPR  SLHPR 
hpsov  13.882  72035.73  0.0013882  4.5  4.64  737-300,400,500 
prsov  89.135  11218.94  0.0089135  3.05  4.64 
pcIr  8.804  113584.7  0.0008804  4  10  prsov
duct  45.455  21999.78  0.0045455  4  2  1--:  89.135 
fame  29.578  33808.91  0.0029578  7.66  8.92 
check  1.34  746268.7  0.000134  4  1.8 
HSreg  37.67  26546.32  0.003767  3.13  5.38  ch 6 
PCLRsensor  16.805  59506.1  0.0016805  2.24  1.53 
Breg  43.077  23214.24  0.0043077  9.94  5.38 
Thermo  9.058  110399.6  0.0009058  4.15  1.39 
sun Pas r o o f .  d canaldatas  PC,P. normal./ Inetware 1*6  sum ir.,Rlind  1M1-1,..,  .1. nAPOI  1 InnTBUR., le6 
Indication  candidates  failrateind Ci  PDi  MTBFind failraten-i  MTBFn-i  MTBURi-u failratei-un 
1  hspc,H,B  70.85485  4  0.470195  14113.4  44.1144 22668.4  48210.56  20.74234 
136  h,H  4.4611  2  224160  0  0  0 
2  h.pc,d,c,H,P,13.T  81.967  8  12200  0  0  0 
236  d.P  3.113  2  321234  0  0  0 
24  pc4  5.8661  2  170471  0  0  0 
245  oc4  2.24405  2  445623  0  0  0 
25  PcM  1.3493  2  741125  0  0  0 
36  d.T  9.0613  2  110359  0  0  0 
4  pc.d  2.71295  2  368602  0  0  0 
5  d.J,  13.12715  2  76178  0  0  0 
26  pr  62.3945  1  1  16027.1  0 0  0  0 
57  f  20.7046  1  48298.4 
LRU  indication  % of FR  fadrateperind  LRU  indication % of FR  fadredcperind 
hpsov  1  25  3 4705  fame  28  25  7.3945 
136  5  0.6941  2368  5  1.4789 
2  70  9.7174  57  70  20.7046 
prsov  1  30  26.7405  check  2  100  1.34 
26  70  62.3945  HSreg  1  45  16.9515 
poll.  2  65  5.7226  136  10  3.767 
24  15  1.3206  2  35  13.1845 
245  10  0.8804  PCLRsen  2  25  4.20125 
25  5  0.4402  236  5  0.84025 
4  5  0.4402  5  70  11.7635 
duct  2  70  31.8185  Breg  1  55  23.69235 
236  5  2.27275  2  35  15.07695 
24  10  4.5455  Thermo  2  10  0.9058 
245  3  1.36365  36  90  8.1522 
25  2  0.9091 
36  2  0.9091 
4  5  2.27275 
5  3  1.36365 
Totals 
s.r,, VFW colkorm  1/FR.1.6  .13,i 
Tot Failrate n-i  Tot MTBF n-i  failratei-un MTBUR i-un MTBUR i-j 
44.11435  22668.360748827 20.74234 48210.564 11218.94 
111/14111Run IM113,A) 
Predicted MTBUR i  Historical MTBUR 
9101.0574  5394 
Figure C7. Spreadsheet calculation and DEPCOST illustration for change 6 80 0 0 
100000 
$70,000
90000  total cost 
80000  $60,000  $71,715 
70000 
$50,000
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0.0008804 4  10  prsov duct  45.455  21999.78 0.0045455 4  2  i= 89.135 famv  29.578  33808.91 0.0029578 7.66  8.92
check  1.34  746268.7 0.000134  4  1.8 HSreg  37.67  26546.32 0.003767  3.13  5.38  ch 7 PCLRsensor  16.805  59506.1  0.0016805 2.24  1 53

Breg  43.077
  23214.24 0.0043077 9.94  5 38
Thermo  9.058  110399.6 0.0009058 4.15  1 39 
1.....S pm - E. C.11.7.  PC.FORI nom.: ." .6 um CO,CINI.nd  1 /G12r.a  4013f naPtli Indication  'WEAR., leo candidates  failrateind Ci  PDi  MTBFind failraten-i 
1  MTBFn-i  MTBURI-u failratei-un
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